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The primary objective of the current study was to test the hypothesis that 
cognitive biases for negative and threatening social information mediate the effect of 
Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and Behavioral Approach System (BAS) sensitivity 
on social anxiety. To test this hypothesis, undergraduate participants (N = 207) were 
initially asked to complete measures of BIS, BAS, and trait social anxiety. Participants 
were then informed that they would be required to give a speech at the end of the study. 
This social-threat induction procedure was immediately followed by the administration of 
a counter-balanced battery of cognitive tasks. After the participants completed the 
cognitive battery, their level of state anxiety in response to the speech task was assessed 
via self-report. Participants were then asked to perform a brief impromptu speech. Latent 
variables were constructed for BIS, BAS, cognitive bias, and social anxiety. Structural 
equation modeling was used to test the hypothesis that cognitive biases mediate the effec  
of BIS and BAS sensitivity on social anxiety. As predicted, the fully-mediat  model 
showed significantly better fit to the data than did several competing models. Th se 
results provide strong support for a mediated model of social anxiety and suggest that 
cognitive biases for negative and threatening social information may be the mec anism 
through which BIS and BAS sensitivity exert their influence upon social anxiety.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Social anxiety refers to excessive fear and anxiety in response to one or more 
social or performance situations. Social phobia refers to the clinical diagnosis given to 
individuals whose social anxiety is so severe that it causes them significant distress or 
seriously impairs their functioning (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Substantial 
evidence suggests that social phobia is essentially an extreme point on the dimension of 
social anxiety (e.g., Furmark, Tillfors, Stattin, Edselius, & Fredrikson, 2000; Rapee, 
1995; Ruscio, Brown, Chiu, Sareen, Stein, & Kessler, 2008; Tillfors et al., 2001; 
Widiger, 2001). Accordingly, the current paper adopts the position taken by many in the 
field (e.g., McNeil, 2001; Rapee & Spence, 2004; Widiger, 2001) that social anxiety is a 
dimensional construct. The low end of the social anxiety dimension is proposed to be 
characterized by an absence of social anxiety and relative fearlessness, wh reas the high 
end of the social anxiety dimension is proposed to be characterized by levels of social 
anxiety so high that they cause significant distress and impairment (McNeil, 2001). Most 
people are proposed to fall in between these two extremes and to experience “normal” 
levels of social anxiety in certain types of social situations. It is estimated, however, that 
approximately 7 - 13% of the population in Western societies will meet diagnostic 
criteria for social phobia at some point during their lifetimes (Furmark, 2002, Furmark et 
al., 1999; Kessler et al., 1994; Ruscio et al., 2008), making it the third most common 
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psychological disorder in Western societies (Kessler et al., 1994) and a major mental 
health concern (Wittchen et al., 1999, 2000).  
Individuals suffering from social phobia frequently experience significant 
interference in several life domains, including academic functioning, career functioning, 
interpersonal relationships, and romantic relationships (APA, 2000; Manuzza et al., 1995; 
Rapee, 1995; Ruscio et al., 2008; Wittchen et al., 1999, 2000). Social phobia is also 
associated with high rates of unemployment, high rates of missed work, decreased work 
productivity, increased utilization of healthcare services, and decreased qualityof life in 
terms of vitality and health (Wittchen et al., 1999, 2000). These problems are likely 
exacerbated by the chronicity of the disorder, as it appears to be moderately stable across 
the lifespan (Pine, Cohen, Gurley, Brook, & Ma, 1998; Rapee, 1995; Rapee & Spence, 
2004). Moreover, individuals with social phobia are at increased risk for developing other 
anxiety disorders, mood disorders, and substance use disorders (Magee, Eaton, Wittchen, 
McGonagle, & Kessler, 1996; Rapee, 1995; Ruscio et al., 2008; Sanderson, Di Nardo, 
Rapee, & Barlow, 1990). After studying the prevalence and sociodemographic profile of 
individuals with social phobia in the general population, Furmark and colleagues (1999) 
concluded that “although the exact diagnostic boundaries for social phobia are difficult to 
determine, it can be concluded that social anxiety is a distressing problem for a 
considerable proportion of the population” (p. 416).   
During the past three decades, researchers have begun to examine a variety of 
factors related to the development and maintenance of social anxiety, and a number of 
models have been put forth (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Ollendick & Hirshfeld-Becker, 
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2002; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Rapee & Spence, 2004). Among the many models that 
have been proposed, Kimbrel’s (2008) recently proposed model of social anxiety is 
unique because it: (a) it integrates a wide range of factors (i.e., genetic, biological, 
temperamental, environmental, and cognitive) into a unified model of the development 
and maintenance of social anxiety, (b) provides a biologically-based personality 
framework for understanding the cognitive biases observed among individuals with social 
anxiety, and (c) predicts the conditions under which these types of cognitive biases are 
most likely to emerge; however, to date, no studies have systematically tested thi  model 
of social anxiety. The goal of the current study was to provide the first direct test of 
Kimbrel’s (2008) hypothesis that cognitive biases for negative and threatening social 
information mediate the effect of Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and Behavioral 
Approach System (BAS) sensitivity on social anxiety.  
 
Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory 
Kimbrel’s mediated model of social anxiety is based largely upon Jeffrey Gra ’s 
Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of personality (RST; Gray, 1970, 1982, 1991; Gray & 
McNaughton, 2000). RST is a biologically-based theory of personality that postulate  
three major subsystems of the brain underlie many of the individual differences seen in 
personality, psychopathology, and reinforcement sensitivity (Gray, 1991; Pickering & 
Gray, 1999). These brain systems are referred to as the BIS, BAS, and Fight-Flight-
Freeze System (FFFS). Individual differences in BIS, BAS, and FFFS sensitivity are 
theorized to underlie two fundamental dimensions of personality—anxiety and 
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impulsivity. Furthermore, RST assumes that normal personality variation lies on a 
continuum with psychopathology. Thus, individuals at the far poles of the anxiety and 
impulsivity dimensions are hypothesized to be at increased risk for developing 
psychopathology (Pickering & Gray, 1999). The core idea underlying RST—the idea that 
anxiety involves the septo-hippocampal system—has remained intact since its iption 
by Gray in 1970 (McNaughton & Corr, 2004); however, the theory has undergone 
substantial revisions in recent years which are described below and are incorporated into 
the current study.  
 
Subsystems of the Brain 
Fight-flight-freeze system. The FFFS is now viewed as the defensive avoidance 
subsystem of the brain. As such, its primary responsibility is to motivate avoidance and 
escape behaviors in response to both conditioned and unconditioned aversive stimuli 
(Corr, 2004). The FFFS is also posited to be the neural substrate for the emotions of fear 
and panic. Several anxiety disorders, including panic disorder and specific phobia, are 
proposed to reflect hyperactivity in the FFFS (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). The major
components of the FFFS from lowest neural and functional level to highest include the 
periaqueductal gray, medial hypothalamus, amygdala, anterior cingulate, and prefrontal 
ventral stream (McNaughton & Corr, 2004).  
Behavioral approach system. The BAS continues to be viewed as the appetitive 
motivational subsystem of the brain. As such, its primary responsibility is to motivate 
approach behavior in response to both conditioned and unconditioned appetitive stimuli 
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(Corr, 2004).  In addition, activity in the BAS is posited to be associated with the positive 
emotions of elation and relief, as well as the “high” associated with drugs of abuse (Gray, 
1994). Hyperactivity in the BAS is proposed to underlie substance abuse (Gray, 1994) 
and mania (Gray, 1991), whereas hypoactivity in the BAS is proposed to underlie 
depression unaccompanied by anxiety (Gray, 1991, 1994). The major components of the 
BAS include the basal ganglia, the dopaminergic fibers ascending from the substantia 
nigra and ventral tegmental area to innervate the basal ganglia, and the motor, 
sensorimotor, and prefrontal cortices (Gray, 1994).  
Behavioral inhibition system. The BIS is now viewed as the defensive approach 
subsystem of the brain. As such, its primary responsibility is to resolve conflicts among 
competing goals (e.g., approach-avoidance conflict) by inhibiting prepotent behavior, 
increasing attention, increasing emotional arousal, and by actively engaging in risk 
assessment behaviors in response to goal conflict (Gray & McNaughton, 2000; 
McNaughton & Corr, 2004). These risk assessment behaviors include both external (i. ., 
environmental) scanning for threat-relevant information and internal scanning of memory 
stores for threat-relevant information. The aim of these processes is goal res lution (Corr, 
2004); however, presumably due to evolutionary pressures, the BIS is proposed to exhibit 
a bias for potentially threatening information so that avoidant responses are alwys
favored (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). The major components of the BIS from lowest 
neural and functional level to highest include the periaqueductal gray, medial 
hypothalamus, amygdala, septo-hippocampal system, posterior cingulate, and prefrontal 
dorsal stream (McNaughton & Corr, 2004).  Hyperactivity in the BIS has been proposed 
 
6 
to underlie several disorders, including generalized anxiety disorder (Gray & 
McNaughton, 2000), depression (Gray, 1991), and social phobia (Gray & McNaughton, 
2000; Kimbrel, 2008).  
 
Personality and its Inheritance 
The foundation of RST is Gray’s (1970, 1991) proposal that Eysenck’s (1967) 
personality dimensions of Neuroticism and Extraversion should be rotated by 30-degrees 
to better reflect the underlying neurobiological systems. Gray (1991) termed his rotated 
personality dimensions “anxiety” and “impulsivity.” The anxiety dimension was
proposed to run from Eysenck’s neurotic-introvert quadrant to the stable-extravert 
quadrant. Anxiety was proposed to be rotated closer to neuroticism and was said to 
reflect activity in the BIS. The impulsivity dimension was proposed to run from 
Eysenck’s stable-introvert quadrant to the neurotic-extravert quadrant. Impulsivity was 
proposed to be closer to extraversion and to reflect activity in the BAS. Gray further 
proposed that individuals high on the BIS-anxiety dimension would be hypersensitive to 
punishing stimuli, whereas individuals high on the BAS-impulsivity dimension would be 
hypersensitive to rewarding stimuli. Experimental studies have supported this proposal 
(Derryberry & Reed, 1994; Gray, 1970, Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Wallace & 
Newman, 1990).  
The relationship of the FFFS to personality has historically been more difficult to 
determine, although it was tentatively suggested to map onto Eysenck’s psychoticism 
dimension at one time (e.g., Gray, 1991). More recently, however, Gray and 
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McNaughton (2000) revised and extended RST with respect to personality and its 
inheritance. Specifically, they have argued that “studies of the inheritance of both human 
neurotic disorders and rodent emotionality strongly suggest...that what is inherited is a 
broad propensity to display a variety of forms of emotional behaviour...spanning both the 
behavioural inhibition and the fight-flight systems” (p. 348). On this basis, they now 
postulate that the personality trait of neuroticism reflects the entire defense system’s 
overall level of sensitivity to threat (i.e., the combined sensitivity of both the BIS and 
FFFS). Similarly, Corr (2004) has argued that it is likely that current self-reports of BIS 
sensitivity actually reflect combined activity in the overall defense system (i.e., combined 
BIS and FFFS functioning). The current paper takes this position as well. Accordingly, 
the term “BIS sensitivity” is used throughout the paper to refer to combined BIS and 
FFFS sensitivity. 
 
BIS Sensitivity and Social Anxiety 
There is now considerable support for the proposal that high levels of BIS 
sensitivity are associated with social anxiety. For example, Coplan, Wilson, Frohlick, and 
Zelenski (2006) examined the association between self-reported BIS and social anxiety
symptoms in a community sample of children. As expected, BIS was positively 
associated with social anxiety. Similar results have been reported among non-clinical 
samples of adults using self-report measures of BIS (e.g., Kashdan & Roberts, 2006; 
Kimbrel, Cobb, Mitchell, Hundt, & Nelson-Gray, 2008). In addition, using the Eysenck 
Personality Inventory (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968), Stemberger, Turner, Beidel, an  
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Calhoun (1995) reported that individuals with social phobia scored significantly higher 
on the personality trait of neuroticism than did a group of normal controls. Bienvenu and 
colleagues (2004) reported similar results using the Revised NEO Personality Inventory 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992).  
Additional support for the proposal that heightened BIS sensitivity underlies 
social anxiety comes from neuroscience studies. For example, using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET), several studies have 
reported increased regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) in the amygdala, hippocam us, 
and prefrontal cortex (key components of the BIS) among social phobics during 
anticipation of a public-speaking task (Tillfors et al., 2001; Furmark et al., 2004; Tillfors, 
Furmark, Marteinsdottir, & Fredrikson, 2002). Etkin and Wager (2007) recently 
conducted a meta-analysis on studies that have used fMRI and PET to examine 
neurobiological deficits in social phobia. These authors concluded that, relative to 
matched control participants, patients diagnosed with social phobia consistently show 
hyperactivation in the amygdala. Additional evidence for the role of the BIS in social
phobia comes from the finding that there is reduced rCBF in the amygdala, hippocampus, 
and prefrontal cortex following successful treatment with cognitive-behavioral ther py 
(Furmark et al., 2002). Taken together, these studies provide strong evidence that 
hypersensitivity in the BIS is associated with increased social anxiety. 
 
Social Anxiety and Cognitive Bias 
There is also considerable support for the idea that individuals experiencing high 
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levels of social anxiety exhibit cognitive biases for negative and threatening social 
information (Clark & Wells, 1995; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Musa & Lepine, 2000; Rapee 
& Heimberg, 1997). In particular, there is growing evidence that socially-anxious 
individuals hold negative beliefs and expectancies about social situations (e.g., Leary, 
Kowalski, & Campbell, 1988; Lucock & Salkovskis, 1988) and exhibit attention and 
memory biases for threatening social information (e.g., Asmundson & Stein, 1994; 
Mansell & Clark, 1999). The evidence for these cognitive biases is reviewed in the 
following section of the paper.  
 
Negative Beliefs and Expectancies Regarding Social Situations 
A number of studies indicate that individuals experiencing high levels of social 
anxiety tend to hold negative beliefs about themselves and their ability to perform in 
social situations, tend to exhibit negative expectancies regarding the outcomes of 
potential social situations, and tend to perceive social experiences in a negative manner
(e.g., Amir, Foa & Coles, 1998; Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996; Leary et al.,1988; 
Lucock & Salkovskis, 1988; Stopa & Clark, 1993, 2000). For example, Leary et al. 
(1988) reported that individuals high on social anxiety tend to believe that other people 
will evaluate them negatively across a wide range of social situations—even if the 
contact is very brief. Similarly, Lucock and Salkovskis (1988) reported that individuals 
with social phobia were more likely than non-clinical control participants to expect 
negative social events to happen to them and were less likely to expect positive social 
events to happen to them.  
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Amir et al. (1998) found that individuals with social phobia were more likely to 
interpret ambiguous social scenarios in a negative manner in comparison to non-anxious 
controls and individuals with other anxiety disorders. Stopa and Clark (1993, 2000) also 
found that individuals with social phobia were more likely to interpret ambiguous social
events in a negative manner than were non-anxious controls and controls with different 
anxiety disorders. In addition, they reported that individuals with social phobia were 
more likely to interpret mildly negative social events in a catastrophic manner than were 
control participants. Taken together, these findings provide strong support for the 
hypothesis that individuals experiencing high levels of social anxiety tend to hold 
negative beliefs about themselves, tend to expect negative outcomes to occur in social
situations, and tend to perceive social situations as more threatening and negative than do 
others.   
 
Attention Bias for Threatening Social Information  
Socially-anxious individuals also tend to exhibit an attention bias for negative and 
threatening social information (e.g., Amir & Foa, 2001; Asmundson & Stein, 1994; 
Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2001; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; 
Lundh & Ost, 1996a; Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993), although some of the evidence 
has been mixed (e.g., Amir et al., 1996). For example, Hope et al. (1990) investigated 
attention bias among individuals with social phobia, panic disorder, and matched controls 
on the revised Stroop task. These researchers reported that individuals with social phobi  
exhibited longer response latencies for words that were associated with social threat (e.g., 
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‘embarrassed’), but did not exhibit longer response latencies for physical thre t words or 
matched control words. In contrast, individuals with panic disorder exhibited longer 
response latencies for physical threat words, but did not exhibit longer response late cies 
for social threat words. Several other studies have reported similar results using the 
revised Stroop task (e.g., Becker et al., 2001; Lundh & Ost, 1996a; Mattia et al., 1993). 
Using the dot-probe paradigm, Asmundson and Stein (1994) reported that individuals 
with social phobia responded faster to probes following social threat words than to probes
following physical threat or neutral words, whereas no differences in response time  to 
the different stimuli were found among control participants. Thus, much of the available 
evidence suggests that individuals experiencing high levels of social anxiety exhibit an 
attention bias for threatening social information. 
 
Memory Bias for Threatening Social Information  
There is also some evidence that socially-anxious individuals exhibit a memory 
bias for negative and threatening social information (e.g., Breck & Smith, 1983;Lundh & 
Ost, 1996b; Mansell & Clark, 1999); however, there are also a number of studies that 
have failed to find evidence of a memory bias among socially-anxious participants (e.g., 
Cloitre, Cancienne, Heimberg, Holt, & Liebowitz, 1995; Rapee, McCallum, Melville, 
Ravenscroft & Rodney, 1994). For example, Rapee et al. (1994) investigated the 
possibility of a memory bias for threatening social information among individuals with 
social phobia in a series of four studies. These researchers failed to find any support for a 
memory bias among individuals with social phobia. The study used several different 
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tasks to assess for possible memory biases, including free recall, cued recall, recognition, 
and stem-completion tasks using socially threatening, physically threatening, a d neutral 
words; however, in each case, there was no evidence for a memory bias. Cloitre and 
colleagues (1995) also failed to find a memory bias for social threat words using 
recognition and free-recall tasks.  
In contrast, Breck and Smith (1983) reported a memory bias for negative social 
information among individuals reporting high levels of social anxiety using a free-recall 
task; however, this bias only occurred when socially-anxious individuals were led to 
believe that they would have to interact with a stranger at a later point in the experiment. 
Similarly, Mansell and Clark (1999) found that individuals high on social anxiety 
recalled fewer positive self-referent words than individuals low on social anxiety when 
they were told that they would have to give a speech prior to recall; however, the bias did 
not occur when the social threat induction procedure was not used.  
Lundh and Ost (1996b) demonstrated a memory bias for threatening social 
information using a different social-threat induction procedure. They hypothesized that 
since “the basic fear in social phobia is about being negatively evaluated by others” (p. 
787) that “a memory bias in social phobia may be most likely to appear with an encoding 
task which activates the social fears of negative evaluation in a more direct way” (p. 
788). Accordingly, they asked participants to rate a series of 20 photographs of faces on 
the degree to which the faces appeared to be either “critical” or “accepting.” F ve minutes 
later, the participants were given a surprise recognition task in which they wer  asked to 
identify the 20 faces they had seen previously from among a group of 80 photographs 
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which also contained 60 distractor photographs. Lundh and Ost reported that the social 
phobia group recognized more of the critical faces than did the control group, whereas 
the control group recognized more of the accepting faces than did individuals with social 
phobia. 
Taken together, these results suggest that under normal conditions, socially-
anxious individuals may not exhibit a memory bias for negative social informati n; 
however, there is growing evidence that socially-anxious individuals may exhibit a 
memory bias for negative social information under conditions of imminent social thre t
(Breck & Smith, 1982; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Lundh & Ost, 1996b; Mansell & Clark, 
1999).  
 
BIS, BAS, and Bias 
The Role of BIS Sensitivity in Social Anxiety  
Building upon the work of Gray (Gray, 1972, 1982, 1990, 1991, 1994) and 
McNaughton (Gray & McNaughton, 2000; McNaughton & Corr, 2004), Kimbrel (2008) 
has proposed that many of the cognitive biases observed among socially-anxious 
individuals are the direct result of heightened BIS sensitivity. Specifically, because the 
BIS is proposed to engage in external and internal scanning for threat-relevant 
information in response to threatening and potentially threatening situations (Gray & 
McNaughton, 2000), Kimbrel proposed that the BIS may be the personality/biological 
basis for the attention and memory biases that have been observed among individuals 
with high levels of social anxiety under conditions of social threat (e.g., Asmundson & 
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Stein, 1994; Breck & Smith, 1983; Lundh & Ost, 1996b; Mansell & Clark, 1999). Gray 
and McNaughton have also reported that the septo-hippocampal system, a major 
component of the BIS, sends simple feedback signals to other areas of the brain, 
including higher level goal processing areas, like the prefrontal cortex. According to Gray 
and McNaughton, the function of these feedback signals is to increase the valenc of 
threatening information in these areas of the brain. Building upon this idea, Kimbrel 
proposed that this biasing process might be the biological basis for the conscious negative 
beliefs and expectancies that individuals with high levels of social anxiety frequently 
report (e.g., Leary et al., 1988) and hypothesized that: 
 
As a result of this biased information processing, [socially-anxious individuals] 
are predicted to perceive (i.e., interpret) novel and ambiguous social situations as 
highly threatening. The end result of this powerful biasing process should be 
consistent fear and avoidance of actual or potentially threatening social situations. 
Additionally, over time, it is expected that [socially-anxious individuals] will 
come to develop negative beliefs, schemas, and expectancies concerning social 
situations and their ability to perform in them as a result of their chronically-
elevated perceptions of threat. Importantly, the proposed model provides a 
theoretical rationale for Hirsch and Clark’s (2004) observation that memory 
biases among [socially-anxious individuals] are most likely to occur following a 
social threat induction procedure. From the perspective of the proposed model, 
potentially threatening social situations should produce the most pronounced 
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information processing biases as these situations often entail goal conflict a d 
should result in the BIS entering into “control mode,” which should lead to 
increased external scanning for threat cues as well as increased internal scanning 
for threat cues (Kimbrel, 2008, p. 605). 
 
Thus, this model proposes that cognitive biases for negative and threatening social 
information mediate the effect of BIS sensitivity on social anxiety under conditions of 
imminent social threat (see Figure 1). 
 To date, this model of social anxiety has not been tested directly; however, the 
existing research does provide some support for this proposal. For example, as mentioned 
above, BIS sensitivity and neuroticism have both been associated with increased social 
anxiety (Bienvenu et al., 2004; Coplan et al., 2006; Kashdan & Roberts, 2006; Kimbrel et 
al., 2008; Stemberger et al., 1995), and social anxiety has been consistently associated 
with cognitive biases for negative and threatening social information (e.g., Asmundson & 
Stein, 1994; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Leary et al., 1988; Lundh & Ost, 1996b; Mansell & 
Clark, 1999; Musa & Lepine, 2000). In addition, BIS sensitivity has been associated with 
lower levels of control beliefs (Windsor, Anstey, Butterworth, & Rodgers, 2008), a 
cognitive tendency to focus on negative information (Noguchi, Gohm, & Dalsky, 2006), 
increased recall of negatively-valenced words in a free-recall task (Gomez & Gomez, 
2006), a tendency to choose negative words to complete word fragments (Gomez & 
Gomez, 2006), and enhanced recognition of negatively-valenced words (Gomez & 
Gomez, 2006).  
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Research on the relationship between BIS-related personality traits and cognitive 
bias provides some additional support for this hypothesis. For example, Derryberry and 
Reed (1994) reported that neurotic introverts tended to exhibit an attention bias for 
negative cues relative to stable extraverts. Given that neurotic introverts should be high 
on BIS, whereas stable extraverts should be low on BIS (Gray, 1991), this finding 
provides additional support for the hypothesis that individuals high on BIS exhibit an 
attention bias for negative information. High levels of neuroticism have also been 
associated with a tendency toward recalling more negative memories and thoughts about 
oneself (e.g., Martin, Ward, & Clark, 1983; Mayo, 1983; Ruiz-Caballero & Bermudez, 
2001), a tendency to hold negative beliefs and the world and ones ability to cope with it 
(Langston & Sykes, 1997), and a tendency to engage in rumination and dysfunctional 
beliefs (Lam, Smith, Checkley, Rijskijk, & Sham, 2003).  
In sum, there is growing evidence that heightened BIS sensitivity is associ ted 
with social anxiety and with a cognitive bias for negative and threatening information. 
There is also substantial evidence that suggests that social anxiety is associated with 
cognitive biases for negative and threatening social information. Thus, while the 
hypothesis that cognitive biases mediate the effect of BIS sensitivity on social anxiety has 
not been tested directly, this proposal is consistent with the available evidence. 
 
The Role of BAS Sensitivity in Social Anxiety 
While Kimbrel’s (2008) model primarily focuses on the role of BIS sensitivity n 
the development and maintenance of social anxiety, it also proposes that low BAS 
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sensitivity plays a significant, albeit modest, role in social anxiety due to the 
interdependent nature of the BIS and BAS systems. This proposal is based on Corr’s 
(2002) joint-subsystems hypothesis, which posits that the BIS and BAS have antgonis ic 
and facilitory effects upon behavior and are functionally interdependent. If Corr’s (2002) 
joint-subsystems hypothesis is correct, then low levels of BAS sensitivity should 
facilitate high BIS sensitivity and should lead to more anxiety and avoidance in response 
to threatening social stimuli. Accordingly, Kimbrel (2008) proposed that low BAS
sensitivity represented an additional risk factor for the development of socialanx ety.  
To date, research examining the role of low BAS sensitivity in social anxiety has 
been mixed (e.g., Coplan et al., 2006; Kashdan, 2002; Kashdan & Roberts, 2006; 
Kimbrel, Robertson, et al., 2007; Kimbrel et al., 2008). For example, consistent with the 
joint-subsystems hypothesis, Kashdan (2002) reported a negative correlation between 
self-reported BAS sensitivity and social anxiety among a large sample of college 
students. Similarly, Coplan et al. (2006) reported that BAS sensitivity was negatively 
associated with two of three measures of social anxiety among a community sample of 
children. In contrast, both Kashdan and Roberts (2006) and Kimbrel et al. (2008) failed to 
find a significant relationship between self-reported BAS sensitivity and social anxiety 
among non-clinical samples of adults; however, in both cases there was a trend toward a 
negative relationship between BAS and social anxiety symptoms. 
Kimbrel and colleagues recently conducted the most comprehensive study to date 
on the relationship between low BAS and social anxiety (Kimbrel, Robertson, et al., 
2007). In this study, two large independent samples of undergraduates (N = 181 and N = 
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543) completed multiple measures of BIS, BAS, and social anxiety symptoms. Principal 
component analysis was used to construct composite variables for BIS, BAS, and socil 
anxiety, and hierarchical regression analyses were used to test the hypothesis that low 
BAS contributes uniquely to the prediction of social anxiety. As predicted, low BAS was 
a significant predictor of social anxiety symptoms in both samples after accounting for 
BIS sensitivity; however, the effect of low BAS sensitivity on social anxiety was modest 
in comparison to the effect of high BIS in both samples.  
Given the growing evidence of a relationship between low BAS and social 
anxiety, the second objective of the current study was to gather additional evidenc  on 
the relationship between low BAS sensitivity and social anxiety. Consistet with Corr’s 
(2002) joint-subsystems hypothesis and Kimbrel’s (2008) mediated model of social 
anxiety, it was hypothesized that the effect of low BAS sensitivity on social anxiety 
would also be mediated by cognitive biases for negative and threatening social 
information. While no previous study has directly examined the relationship between 
BAS sensitivity, cognitive bias, and social anxiety, this hypothesis was consistent with 
current RST theory (e.g., Corr, 2002; Gray, 1990, 1991, 1994; Gray & McNaughton, 
2000). For example, referring to both the BIS and BAS, Gray (1990) argued that 
“neurobiological research with animals suggests that the brain systems mdiating 
emotion overlap with those mediating cognition to such a degree that it is difficult to 
maintain any clear distinction between them” (p. 269).  
This hypothesis is also consistent with previous research. For example, high BAS 
sensitivity has been associated with positive expectancies (Beevers & Meyer, 2002), 
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increased approach goals (Jones, Shams, & Liversidge, 2007), higher levels of perceived 
control (Windsor, Anstey, Butterworth, & Rodgers, 2008), and a cognitive tendency to 
focus on positive information (Noguchi et al., 2006). A study conducted by Gomez and 
Gomez (2002) found that high BAS sensitivity was associated with increased recall of 
positively-valenced words in a free-recall task, a tendency to choose positive words to 
complete word fragments, enhanced recognition of positively-valenced words, and 
decreased recall of negatively-valenced words in a free-recall task. In addition, Beevers 
and Meyer (2002) reported that decreased positive experiences and decreased positiv  
expectancies mediated the effect of low BAS sensitivity on symptoms of depression. 
Thus, while no previous study has directly examined the relationship between low BAS 
sensitivity, cognitive bias, and social anxiety, the hypothesis that cognitive b ases would 
mediate the effect of low BAS on social anxiety was consistent with both current theory 
and research. 
 
Study Objective 
The primary objective of the current study was to test the hypothesis that 
cognitive biases for negative and threatening social information mediate the effect of BIS 
and BAS sensitivity on social anxiety. To test this hypothesis, participants were initially 
asked to complete measures of BIS, BAS, and trait social anxiety. A social-thre t 
induction procedure was employed next. Specifically, participants were told that they 
would be asked to give a short speech at the end of the study. This procedure was 
immediately followed by a counter-balanced battery of cognitive tasks asse sing memory 
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bias, belief bias, expectancy bias, attention bias, and perception of threat. After the 
participants completed the cognitive battery, their level of state anxiety was assessed via 
self-report immediately before they began the speech task. Participan s were then 
randomly selected and asked to give a brief impromptu speech. After each speec, th  
speaker’s level of anxiety during the speech was rated by the audience members. 
Correlational analyses were used to examine the relationships among the study variables, 
and structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to test the hypothesized model (Figur
2) against other alternative models.   
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
 
 
Participants 
Two-hundred and nineteen undergraduate students were recruited from the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro subject pool to participate in the study. Age 
and fluency in English were the only exclusionary criteria for participation in the study. 
Specifically, since personality is typically not viewed as fully formed until 18 years of 
age (APA, 2000), and since personality was an integral part of the current study, only 
participants who were 18 years of age or older and fluent in English were eligible to 
participate. All of the participants received course credit for their participa ion in the 
study.  
Twelve participants (approximately 5%) scored above the recommended cut-off
score of three or higher on the Infrequency Scale (IFS; Chapman & Chapman, 1986), 
which suggests that it is likely that these participants used a random response style while 
completing the initial battery of questionnaires. Accordingly, these participants were 
excluded from all of the statistical analyses, yielding a final sample of 207 participants. 
Of the remaining sample of 207 participants, 50 (24%) scored at or above the clinical cut-
off score of 24 on the Social Phobia Scale (Heimberg, Mueller, Holt, Hope, & Liebowitz, 
1992), which suggests that approximately one-fourth of the final sample was 
experiencing clinically-significant levels of social anxiety at the time of the study. Sixty-
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seven percent of the final sample was female, and 70% of the final sample was Euro-
American, both of which were consistent with the University’s demographic profile. The 
participants’ mean age was 19.1 years (SD= 5.8) and their mean cumulative grade point 
average was 3.3 (SD = .59). Table 1 provides a summary of the participants’ 
demographic information.  
 
Materials 
Demographic Form – Participants were asked to provide basic demographic 
information about their age, gender, ethnicity, college standing, and cumulative grade 
point average on a demographic form at the beginning of each study session.  
Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire – Th
Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire (SPSRQ; Torrubia, 
Avila, Molto, & Caseras, 2001) is a 48-item binary response self-report measure used to 
assess individual differences in BIS and BAS sensitivity.  The SPSRQ contains a 24-item 
sensitivity to punishment subscale that assesses BIS sensitivity and a 24-item sensitivity 
to reward subscale that assesses BAS sensitivity. The SPSRQ has demonstrated good 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability in several previous studie  (e.g., Torrubia et 
al., 2001; Torrubia, Avila, Molto, & Grande, 1995). The SPSRQ has also demonstrated 
good convergent validity with laboratory measures (Avila, 2001), self-report measures 
(Brebner & Martin, 1995; Caseras, Avila, & Torrubia, 2003), and with relevant brain 
structures (i.e., the hippocampal formation and amygdala) using voxel-based 
morphometry (Barrós-Loscertles et al., 2006). 
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Infrequency Scale – The Infrequency Scale (IFS; Chapman & Chapman, 1986) is 
a 13-item scale designed to assess random responding. IFS items were intermixed among 
the SPSRQ items to provide an index of random responding. Sample items include “On 
some mornings do you get out of bed when you wake up?” and “Can you remember a 
time when you talked with someone who wore glasses?” Scores of three or higher 
indicate a random response style. Consequently, participants who scored three or higher 
on the IFS (N = 12) were not used in any of the statistical analyses.  
Social Phobia Scale – The Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) is a 20-
item self-report measure that was administered to participants to assess their trait levels 
of social anxiety. Respondents rated the level of expected anxiety they would experience 
while performing a variety of different activities in public settings, such as eating and 
speaking in public. The Social Phobia Scale is a well-established measure of social 
anxiety symptoms that has demonstrated excellent reliability and validity in previous 
research studies (e.g., Heimberg et al., 1992; Herbert, Rheingold, & Brandsma, 2001; 
Orsillo, 2001; Osman, Gutierrez, Barrios, Kopper, & Chiros, 1998). A score of 24 or 
higher on the Social Phobia Scale indicates that a diagnosis of social phobia is likely and 
that social anxiety symptoms are clinically significant (Heimberg et al., 1992). In the 
current study, the Social Phobia Scale was used only to validate the social threat 
manipulation and the state anxiety measures. Specifically, it was assumed that if the 
social-threat manipulation was successful, that there would be a positive correlati n 
between scores on the Social Phobia Scale and scores on the state anxiety measures.  
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – The state version of the State-Trait Anxiety 
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Inventory (Spielberger, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) is a 20-item self-report measure 
designed to assess levels of state anxiety. The state version of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory has been widely used in clinical and research settings, and it has demonstrated 
good reliability and validity in previous research applications (Spielberger t al., 1983). 
In the current study, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory was used as a measure of state 
anxiety in response to the speech task.  
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – The Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) is a 20-item self-report measure 
used to assess positive and negative affect. The 10-item Positive Affect scal  is used to 
assess positive affect, whereas the 10-item Negative Affect scale i us d to assess 
negative affect. The PANAS has consistently demonstrated good reliability nd validity 
in previous research studies (e.g., Watson et al., 1988; Watson & Clark, 1994; Watson & 
McKee Walker, 1996). Indeed, Thompson (2007) notes that the PANAS has been 
“exceptionally well-validated” and has been cited in over 2,000 scholarly papers 
(Thompson, 2007, p. 228). In the current study, the Negative Affect scale was used as a 
measure of state anxiety in response to the speech task.  
Beck Anxiety Inventory – The Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & 
Steer, 1988) is a 21-item self-report measure of physiological anxiety symptoms. The 
Beck Anxiety Inventory has been widely used in both research and clinical setting , and 
it has demonstrated good reliability and validity in previous research applictions (e.g., 
Beck et al., 1988; Osman, Kopper, Barrios, Osman, & Wade, 1997). In the current study, 
the directions of the Beck Anxiety Inventory were altered so that participants were asked 
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to rate the degree to which they were currently experiencing the symptoms listed in 
response to the impending speech task. Thus, in the current study, the Beck Anxiety
Inventory was used as a measure of state anxiety in response to the speech task. 
Audience Rating of Anxiety – Participants’ level of state anxiety during the speech 
task was also rated by the audience members on the Audience Rating of Anxiety scale. 
Specifically, each of the audience members (i.e., all of the participants and experimenters 
present in each study session) was provided with a copy of the Audience Rating of 
Anxiety scale and was instructed to rate “how anxious or nervous the speaker appeared 
while giving the speech” immediately after each speaker finished the speech task. The 
speakers were rated on a five-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 = “notnervous at all” 
to 5 = “very nervous.”  The Audience Rating of Anxiety scores for each particint were 
averaged across all available raters to produce an average Audience Rating of Anxiety 
score for each participant that gave a speech. The Audience Rating of Anxiety scal  was 
included in the current study so that a latent variable for social anxiety in response to the 
speech task could be created that included both self-report data and independent 
behavioral observations.  
Self-Statements During Public-Speaking Scale – The Self-Statements During 
Public-Speaking Scale (Hofmann & DiBartolo, 2000) is a 10-item self-report measur  
designed to assess beliefs related to public speaking. The Self-Statements During Public-
Speaking Scale contains two subscales—the Positive Self-Statements subscale and the 
Negative Self-Statements subscale. Both of the subscales have demonstrated good 
internal consistency, good test-retest reliability, and good convergent and discriminant 
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validity in clinical and non-clinical samples (Hofmann & DiBartolo, 2000). The wording 
of the Self-Statements During Public-Speaking Scale was modified in the current study 
so that participants were asked to endorse whether the self-statements wer indicative of 
their current thoughts as they anticipated giving the speech, rather than their thoughts 
during the past two weeks.  
Speech Expectancies Scale – The Speech Expectancies Scale is a simple self-
report measure that was designed for the current study to assess participants’ expectations 
regarding the speech task. The Speech Expectancies Scale was created fo  the current 
study because of the lack of available instruments to assess speech expectancies 
regarding an impending speech task. The scale consisted of six items and two 
subscales—the Positive Speech Expectancies scale and the Negative Speech 
Expectancies scale. Participants rated each item on a 5-point Likert scal  ranging from “1 
= not at all” to “5 = very.” The Positive Speech Expectancies scale consisted of three 
items: “Please rate how likely you think it is that your peers will evaluate you positively 
during the speech,” “Please rate how likely you are to perform well during the speech 
task,” and “Please rate how likely you think it is that giving this speech will be an 
enjoyable experience.”  The Negative Speech Expectancies scale consisted of the 
following three items:  “Please rate how likely you think it is that your pee s will evaluate 
you negatively during the speech,” “Please rate how likely you are to perform poorly
during the speech task,” and “Please rate how likely you think it is that giving this speech 
will be a terrible experience.” Both scales exhibited good internal consistency in the 
current study (see Table 5).  
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Perception of Threat Rating – Because Kimbrel (2008) hypothesized that 
socially-anxious individuals would perceive social and performance situations as more 
threatening than individuals who were not socially anxious, the participants were also 
asked to provide Perception of Threat ratings regarding the speech task on a five-point 
Likert scale at the end of the Speech Expectancies Scale. Specifically, each of the 
participants was asked to rate “How threatened do you feel by the prospect f having to 
give a speech in front of your peers?” on a five-point Likert scale that ranged from “Not 
at all” to “Very.” This rating scale was administered along with the other cognitive 
measures in the cognitive task battery that participants completed before beginning the 
speech task.  
Incidental Free Recall Task – An incidental free recall task was used to assess 
memory bias for negative and threatening social information. During the encoding phase 
of this task, participants were asked to rate whether or not a list of 38 trait wo ds 
described how others would view them during the speech task. Table 2 provides the 
complete list of stimulus words used in the free recall task. Half of the words were 
negative words associated with social anxiety and poor social performance (e.g., nervous, 
tense), whereas the other half were positive words associated with social suc ess (e.g., 
confident, composed). The majority of these words were selected from previous studie  
examining cognitive biases for threatening and non-threatening social words among 
socially-anxious individuals (e.g., MacLeod, Matthews, & Tata, 1986; Mansell & Clark, 
1999; Matthew et al., 1989).  
The first and last four words in the word list served as primacy and recency 
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buffers and were not included in the statistical analysis of memory bias (Mansell & 
Clark, 1999). The test set of 30 words (15 negative words and 15 positive words) in the 
middle of the word list was equated on word length and word frequency with the ratings 
provided by Balota et al. (2002). The Hyperspace Analogue to Language (HAL) norms 
(Lund & Burgess, 1996) for word frequency were used to determine word frequency. The 
HAL norms for word frequency were chosen because they are the most recent word 
frequency norms available and because they have been shown to be stronger predictors of 
lexical decision time than the Kucera and Francis (1967) norms (Balota, Cortese, 
Sergent-Marshall, Spiegler, & Yap, 2004). To control for serial position effects, three 
versions of the word list were produced. In each list, the primacy and recency buffers 
remained the same; however, three randomly-generated versions of the 30 test items were 
created with the stipulation that there be no more than two positive or two negative words 
in a row (Mansell & Clark, 1999).  
Following the encoding task, participants were cognitively distracted for two 
minutes with the distraction procedure used by Breck and Smith (1983). Specifically, 
participants were asked to cross out the letter “E” from a page of random letters for 2 
minutes. Afterwards, participants were asked to write down as many of the traits as they 
could remember from the list of traits they rated during the encoding task. Following the 
recall task, participants completed a second cognitive distraction task to ensure that the 
recalled words were not primed while they completed the other cognitive tasks. The 
second cognitive distraction task used a different grid of letters than the first; however, it 
was identical to the first in all other respects. 
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Embedded Word Task – The Embedded Word Task (Wenzlaff et al., 2001) was 
used to assess attention bias for threatening social information. This task is es entially the 
same as a “word search” game. Thus, participants were instructed to search a letter grid 
for hidden words and to write down all of the words that they were able to find during a 
four-minute time period. Three different versions of the Embedded Word Task were 
created using the commercial software program, 1-2-3 Word Search Maker ®, to control 
for the position and arrangement of words across participants. Each of the three versions 
of the Embedded Word Task was visually inspected to ensure that there were no readily 
apparent solutions (e.g., the word “awkward” being readily apparent in the middle of the 
puzzle).  
Three different valence categories of words were used: negative social words 
(e.g., awkward), positive social words (e.g., achieve), and neutral words (e.g., lawn). The 
neutral words were included to divert participants’ attention away from the social nature 
of the words. All stimulus words were between 3 and 7 letters in length. Negative social 
words, positive social words, and neutral words were chosen from previous studies 
examining cognitive biases for threatening and non-threatening social words among 
individuals with high levels of social anxiety (e.g., MacLeod et al., 1986; Mansell & 
Clark, 1999; Matthew et al., 1989); however, all of the words used in the Embedded 
Word Task were different from those that were used in the free recall task. Positive and 
negative words that appeared to be particularly relevant to self-presentational concerns 
about giving a speech (e.g., “stupid,” “calm”) were selected when available. Neutral 
words were drawn from the same studies as well as other studies examining cognitive 
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biases with other types of clinical populations (e.g., Wenzlaff et al., 2001). As with the 
free-recall task, each set of ten words was equated on word length and word frequency 
with the ratings provided by Balota et al. (2002). The HAL norms (Lund & Burgess, 
1996) were used to determine word frequency. Table 3 provides the complete list of 
stimulus words that were used in the Embedded Word Task.  
The Embedded Word Task was conducted in the same way that it had been 
conducted in previous research with one important exception. In previous studies, 
participants were given a lengthy number to remember while they were completing the 
task to put them in a state of “cognitive load.” However, the current study did not use a 
cognitive load procedure because Kimbrel (2008) hypothesized that social threat alone 
should be sufficient to induce a cognitive bias for negative and threatening social 
information. Accordingly, the cognitive load procedure was not used in order to provide 
the most stringent test of Kimbrel’s social threat hypothesis.  
Behavioral Assessment Test – At the end of the study, participants were asked to 
participate in a Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT). Specifically, participants were asked 
to prepare and give a short speech on a controversial topic in front of the other 
participants. Approximately half way through the study, all of the participants were given 
a Speech Topics Form and were instructed to choose a speech topic from among five 
different controversial speech topics, including “Should gay marriage be legalized?,” 
“Should drugs be legalized?,”  “Should animal research be made illegal?,” “Should 
tobacco be outlawed?,” and “Wrestling and football: Should females be allowed to 
compete?”  This portion of the study served as the main social threat induction procedure. 
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The speech topics were chosen for inclusion in this study on the basis that they be both 
relevant to college students and at least somewhat controversial in nature. Controversial 
topics were chosen to ensure that there was a possibility of negative evaluation from 
other participants in the study.  
At the beginning of the social threat induction procedure, the Speech Topics Form 
was passed out, and all of the participants were given three-minutes to collect their 
thoughts about the speech topic. They were also asked to circle which speech topic they 
would speak about, and they were allowed to make notes on Speech Topics Form. This 
form was then collected from the participants after the three minute period was over to 
ensure that the speeches were impromptu in nature. Participants then completed the 
cognitive tasks in counter-balanced order. After the cognitive tasks were completed, the 
participants completed the state anxiety measures in counter-balanced order. After all of 
the state anxiety measures had been completed, the Public-Speaking Performance Rating 
Scale (PSPRS) was passed out to participants. A random numbers table was used to 
randomly select participants for the BAT.  
Once selected, participants were asked to go to the front of the classroom and to 
give their speech. Most of the speeches were less than a minute and none of the speeches
lasted longer than 3 minutes. After each speaker completed the speech task, the reearch 
assistants and other participants rated the speaker on the PSPRS. Participants were 
instructed to not rate themselves on the PSPRS and to instead skip that section and move 
on to the next participant. All participants were asked to complete the speech task until 
each participant had gone or until the 2-hour mark had been reached, at which time the 
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BAT was discontinued. Of the 207 participants, four participants refused to participate in 
the BAT. In addition, 40 participants were unable to complete the task because the 2-hour 
time mark was reached before they were called. Thus, a total of 163 participants (79%) 
completed the BAT.  
Public Speaking Performance Rating Scale – The PSPRS was a modified version 
of the Social Performance Rating Scale (SPRS; Fydrich, Chambless, Perry, Buergner, & 
Beazley, 1998) that was used by the participants and the experimenters to rate the 
participants’ public speaking ability during the speech task. The primary purpose of 
including the PSPRS in the current study was to enhance the social-threat induction 
procedure by making participants more aware of the fact that they would be evaluat d by 
the audience members during the speech task. A secondary purpose for including the 
PSPRS in the current study was to collect pilot data for future studies concerning the 
manner in which audience members perceive individuals with social anxiety while they 
are speaking in public.  
The SPRS, which is the measure that the PSPRS was derived from, has 
demonstrated good reliability and validity in two previous studies (Fydrich et al., 1998; 
Harb, Eng, Zaider, & Heimberg, 2003); however, since the SPRS was originally 
developed to assess behavior during a one-on-one role play procedure, the original 
version of the SPRS was unsuitable for use in the current study. Accordingly, the PSPRS 
was created to allow untrained audience members to rate their perceptions of he 
speakers’ public-speaking abilities. The six items on the PSPRS asked audi nce members 
to rate each of the speakers’ performance on several key dimensions of public-speak ng 
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(e.g., gaze, vocal quality, enthusiasm) using a 5-point Likert scale. Internal consistency 
for the six-item PSPRS in the current study was excellent (α = .97), indicating that it may 
be possible in the future to reliably measure perception of public-speaking performance 
with untrained observers; however, because public-speaking performance was not the 
variable of interest in the current study, and because approximately 20% of the 
participants did not complete the speeches, the data collected from this measure were 
viewed as exploratory in nature and were not included in the statistical analyses. 
 
Procedure 
Recruiting procedure and group size. Participants signed up for the study through 
the MomentumTM website in small groups. In all, 24 separate sessions were conducted. 
The mean number of participants per group was 9.1 (SD = 5.4). The number of 
participants per group ranged from two to nineteen participants. All of the sessions were 
conducted in two identical classrooms that contained approximately 25 seats each. 
Protocol. A detailed research protocol was developed for the study to ensure that 
the study was conducted in a consistent manner. The protocol specified all of the 
procedures that the research assistants (RAs) were to follow while conducting the study. 
The protocol also included written instructions for all aspects of the study which were 
read verbatim by the RAs.  There were at least two RAs present for every session. The 
first RA was designated as Experimenter 1, and the primary job of this RA was to 
communicate to the participants and to read the protocol verbatim. Only graduate 
students and senior-level undergraduate students who had been trained by the principal 
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investigator were allowed to serve as Experimenter 1. The primary responsibility of the 
Experimenter 2 position was to quickly pass out and collect measures from the 
participants. Typically, undergraduate RAs with less research experi nc  served in the 
role of Experimenter 2. All RAs received extensive training from the PI and other trained 
RAs prior to conducting the study.  
Consent procedure and the initial battery of measures. Upon arrival, participants 
were asked to sit at desks. On top of each desk there was a copy of the consent form, a 
packet of questionnaires, and a Post-It © note in the upper right corner that contained the 
ID number that corresponded to the packet of questionnaires. The consent form explained 
the basics of the study and stated that all participants would be asked to give a short 
speech at the end of the study. All participants were asked to read and sign the consent 
form before going any further. In addition, all participants were given an opportunity to 
ask questions about the consent form and to withdraw if they so chose. No participants 
withdrew from the study during the consent procedure; however, four participants did 
choose to discontinue at later points in the study because they did not want to participate 
in the BAT. After the consent forms were signed and collected, the partici nts were 
instructed to complete the initial packet of questionnaires as carefully as possibly and 
then to sit quietly until the other participants had completed their packets. The initial 
packet of questionnaires contained the demographic form, the SPSRQ, and the Social 
Phobia Scale.  
Social-threat induction procedure. After all of the initial packets of measures had 
been completed and collected, Experimenter 2 handed out the Speech Topics Form to the 
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participants while Experimenter 1 instructed them as follows:  
 
“As I said before, in this study, we are interested in examining how well personality 
predicts performance and psychological functioning. Accordingly, in this part of the 
study, you will be asked to perform a variety of tasks, including completing a variety 
of word problems and preparing and performing an impromptu speech in front of the 
other participants on a controversial topic. I would like to state right away that unlike 
some other studies you may have heard about or may have participated in, we are in 
no way deceiving you about the speech task. It is a critical part of this study, and each 
of you will be required to give a speech at the end of the study. In addition, you 
should know that your speeches will be evaluated by the other participants on the 
Speech Performance Evaluation Sheets that we will provide to you.  We have 
structured the study so that the speech task is the last phase of the study because the 
length of the speech task depends entirely on the number of participants present for a 
particular study. Thus, after we complete the remaining performance tasks, we will
proceed to the speech task.  Does anyone have any questions about the speech task 
before we go any further?” 
 
After Experimenter 1 answered participant questions, the participants were 
provided with the following instructions: 
 
“Please look at the form we just provided you with. Now, look at the participant ID 
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number that is written down on the piece of paper in the upper right hand corner of 
the desk. Please write that number clearly and neatly on the form we just gave you 
where it says ID Number in the upper right hand corner. You will need to do this for 
each measure that you are given for the remainder of the study. Thank you. Now, as I 
said before, we are interested in how personality predicts performance, and you will
be asked to perform a variety of performance tasks today. The last task, which will be 
approximately 20 minutes from now, involves giving an impromptu speech in front of 
the other participants. At this time, we would like to give you a few minutes to 
determine your speech topic and to collect your thoughts. You may choose to speak 
on one of the following topics: ‘Should gay marriage be legalized?’, ‘Should animal 
research be illegal?’, ‘Should tobacco be outlawed?’, ‘Should prayer be allowed in 
school?’, and ‘Wresting and football: Should women be allowed to compete?’ Please 
circle the topic that you will speak on and then take the next 3 minutes to write down 
the main points that you want to make. You may write down your thoughts on this 
paper if you choose; however, we will be collecting these pieces of paper in a few 
minutes as the goal of this task is to asses your ability to perform an i promptu 
speech. You may begin now.” 
 
Experimenter 2 used a stopwatch to time this portion of the study. After 3 
minutes, the Speech Topics Forms were collected from the participants. After the social 
threat induction procedure was completed, the cognitive tasks (i.e., memory, attention, 
beliefs, expectancies, perception of threat rating) were administered to the participants in 
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counter-balanced order to control for order effects.  
Memory task. During the memory task portion of the cognitive battery, 
participants were given the Word Rating Form and were told the following:  
 
“In front of you is a list of words that can be used to describe people while they are 
performing speeches. Please rate whether or not you think each of the following 
words describes how you will look while you are giving your speech. If you think tat 
a word describes how you will look while you’re giving your speech, place a 
checkmark next to it.” 
 
After the word rating forms had been collected, the participants were given a page 
of random letters and were instructed to cross out every letter “E” they saw as quickly as 
they could for two minutes. Participants were then provided with the Memory for Words 
Form and were instructed to write down as many of the traits as they could rememb r 
from the Word Rating Form they had seen during the encoding task. Participants were 
given four minutes to complete this task. Afterwards, participants completed a second 
cognitive distraction task that was identical to the first with the exception that the letter 
grid was different. The second cognitive distraction procedure was included to ensure
that the recalled words were not primed while participants completed the other cognitive 
tasks.  
Attention task. During the attention task portion of the cognitive battery, the 
Embedded Word Task was passed out to participants, and they were instructed as 
 
38 
follows:  
 
“In front of you is a word search puzzle. Please try to find as many words as you can 
during the next four minutes. Words can go forward, backward, horizontally, 
vertically, and diagonally in all eight directions. When you find a word, circle it, then 
write it down immediately. You may begin now.” 
 
After four minutes, the Embedded Word Tasks were collected.  
Beliefs, expectancies, and perception of threat battery. To save time, the Speech 
Expectancies Scale, the modified version of the Self-Statements during Public-Speaking 
Scale, and the Perception of Threat rating scale were administered to participants within 
the same packet; however, within this packet, the measures were counter-balanced to 
control for order effects. In addition, this battery of questionnaires was counter-balanced 
with the attention and memory tasks. After the packets of questionnaires were given to 
the participants, they were instructed as follows:  
 
“These questionnaires assess different beliefs and expectations that people have 
regarding speaking in public. Please read the directions carefully and then complete 
each questionnaire as carefully as you can. You can raise your hand when you are 
done, and we will come around to collect them from you.” 
 
State anxiety battery. After the cognitive battery was finished, the participants 
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were given the state anxiety battery. This battery of questionnaires contained the Beck 
Anxiety Inventory, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, and PANAS in randomized order. 
After receiving the packets, the participants were instructed as follows:  
 
“In front of you are three measures that assess how you are feeling RIGHT NOW as 
you anticipate getting ready to give your speeches, which will be the next and final 
part of the study. Please take your time and complete the measures in front of you 
as carefully as you can. The instructions for each measure are written at the top of 
the page; please read these instructions carefully and be sure to fill in the bubbles 
completely so that they will scan correctly. Please raise your hand when you are 
done, and we will come around to check your packets and collect them if you are 
done. You may begin now.” 
 
Behavioral assessment task. After all of the participants had completed the state 
anxiety battery, the PSPRS forms were passed out to the participants, and the following 
instructions were provided to the participants:  
 
“Please write down your ID number in the top right corner and enter in today’s date. 
As each speaker announces their ID number, write it down. Then rate each speaker 
using the scale provided. Continue doing this until all of the speakers are done. Also, 
please do not rate yourself. Instead, just skip that one and move on to the next one 
when it is your turn to speak.” 
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A random numbers table was used to determine the order in which speakers 
would be announced prior to beginning the speech task. When called, each speaker 
walked to the front of the room, announced their ID number, announced the topic of their 
speech, and proceeded to give their speech. Most of the speeches were short and less than 
one minute. After each speaker finished, the audience applauded briefly and then rated 
the speakers on the PSPRS and the Audience Rating of Anxiety scale. This proces
continued until all of the participants had given their speech or until the two-hour time 
limit was reached. Once either of these occurred, the speech task was discontinued. 
Participants were then debriefed and given experimental credits commensurat  with the 
amount of time they had spent in the study. Table 4 provides a summary of the 
procedures and measures employed in the current study. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
 
Preliminary Statistical Analyses 
Means, standard deviations, and alphas were calculated for all of the measures 
used in the current study (Table 5). The internal consistency for the self-rport measures 
ranged from .78 (Sensitivity to Reward scale) to .96 (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory), 
which indicates that the internal consistency reliability for the measur s employed in the 
current study ranged from adequate to excellent (Kline, 2005). Due to the correlati nal 
nature of the hypotheses, the negative bias scoring procedure used by Matthews, Mogg, 
May, and Eysenck, (1989) was used, and negative bias scores were created for th  four 
cognitive variables that contained both positive and negative scores (i.e., the beliefs,
expectancies, attention, and memory variables). These scores were computed by 
subtracting positive scores from negative scores so that a single negative bi s index score 
could be used in the primary statistical analyses. The resulting negative bis scores are 
interpreted as follows: high negative bias scores reflect a disproportionately high number 
of negative cognitions relative to positive cognitions and reflect a cognitive bias for 
negative information; low negative bias scores (i.e., negative scores) refl ct a 
disproportionately low number of negative cognitions relative to positive cognitions and 
reflect a cognitive bias for positive information. The minimum and maximum values, 
means, and standard deviations for the four negative cognitive bias scores are displ yed 
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in Table 6. 
A correlation matrix was generated to examine if the primary predictors we e 
related to one another as hypothesized (Table 7). As expected, BIS sensitivity correlated 
positively with belief bias, expectancy bias, memory bias, and perceived threat, wh reas 
BAS sensitivity correlated negatively with belief bias, expectancy bias, and perceived 
threat. Contrary to predictions, BAS was unrelated to memory bias, and both BIS and 
BAS were unrelated to attention bias. BIS and BAS were also unrelated to one anoth r, 
although there was a non-significant trend toward a negative relationship (r = -.11, ns), 
which is consistent with current theory (i.e., Corr, 2002’s joint-subsystems hypothesis).  
Memory bias, belief bias, and expectancy bias were all positively correlated with 
each other. In contrast, attention bias was not significantly related to any f the other 
predictor variables. To assess if attention bias was related to any of the study variables, a 
correlation matrix containing the three attention task variables (i.e., negative words 
found, positive words found, negative attention bias score), the other primary predictor 
variables, and the criterion variables was generated (Table 8). This analysis revealed that 
the three attention variables were unrelated to all other study variables. Accordingly, the 
attention bias variable was dropped from all of the remaining analyses.  
To better examine the relationship between BIS, BAS, and the measures of 
cognition, a correlation matrix containing, BIS, BAS, and the negative and positive 
cognition scores was generated (Table 9). Analysis of this matrix revealed that BIS 
sensitivity correlated positively with each of the negative cognition scores (i.e., number 
of negative words recalled on the memory task, total negative beliefs score, total negative 
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expectancies score, perceived threat) and negatively with each of the positive cognition 
scores. Conversely, BAS sensitivity correlated positively with the positive beliefs score 
and with the positive expectancies score. BAS also correlated negatively with the 
negative beliefs score, the negative expectancies score, and with perceived threat. BAS 
sensitivity was unrelated to both positive and negative memory scores, although there 
was a non-significant trend (r = .10, ns) toward a positive relationship between BAS 
sensitivity and total number of positive words recalled.  
Next, a correlation matrix was generated to examine the relationships among the 
criterion variables (Table 10). The relationships among the criterion variables were all as 
expected. The three self-report measures of state anxiety correlated positively with one 
another, with the Social Phobia Scale, and with Audience-Rated Anxiety. These findings 
suggest that the social threat manipulation was successful and that individuals high on 
social anxiety did experience increased state anxiety in response to the social-threat 
induction procedure. In addition, the positive correlation between Audience-Rated 
Anxiety and the three self-report state anxiety measures suggests that audience members 
were able to accurately perceive the speakers’ levels of state anxi ty during the speech. 
A final correlation matrix containing all of the remaining predictor and criterion 
variables was generated in order to provide initial tests of the study hypotheses at the 
zero-order level (Table 11). As expected, BIS sensitivity correlated positively with the 
cognitive bias measures and with the social anxiety measures. The cognitive bias 
measures correlated positively with the social anxiety measures. BAS sensitivity was 
correlated negatively with scores on the Social Phobia Scale (trait social anx ety) and 
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with scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (state social anxiety); however, the 
correlations between BAS and the Beck Anxiety Inventory and the Negativ Affect scale 
were non-significant, although they were in the predicted direction (i.e., negative). With 
respect to the zero-order relationship between BAS sensitivity and cognitive bias, as 
expected, BAS sensitivity correlated negatively with belief bias, expectancy bias, and 
perceived threat; however, BAS sensitivity was unrelated to memory bias.  
 
Structural Equation Modeling 
To assess the fit of the hypothesized model to the data, SEM based on maximum 
likelihood estimation was conducted using version 7.0 of AMOS (Analysis of Moment 
Structures; Arbuckle, 2006). SEM is essentially a combination of factor analysis nd path 
analysis (Kline, 2005). This type of statistical analysis was chosen to testhe 
hypothesized model because it has several advantages over traditional statistical 
techniques. Specifically, SEM corrects for measurement error, allows b th latent and 
observed variables to be evaluated within the same model, enables users to conduct tests 
of entire models in a single analysis, and it allows for entire models to be tested against 
other competing models (Kline, 2005). Given that the primary goal of the current study 
was to provide the first direct test of Kimbrel’s (2008) mediated model of social anxiety, 
SEM appeared to be the most appropriate type of statistical analysis to employ.  
The original version of the hypothesized SEM model is presented in Figure 2; 
however, because it was necessary to drop the attention bias variable from all of the 
remaining statistical analyses, it was necessary to modify the hypothesized SEM model. 
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Specifically, the attention bias variable, which had been an indicator for the cognitive 
bias latent variable, was removed from the hypothesized SEM model because the 
correlational analyses indicated that this variable was unrelated to all other study 
variables. A graphical representation of the revised version of the hypothesized model is 
presented in Figure 3.   
Measurement portions of the hypothesized model. The hypothesized model 
(Figure 3) contained four latent variables—BIS Sensitivity, BAS Sensitivity, Cognitive 
Bias, and Social Anxiety. Structural equation models that include item parcels s 
indicators are referred to as partial disaggregation models, whereas structural equation 
models that include all of the individual items from a particular scale are referred to as 
total disaggregation models (Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994; Leone, Perugini, Bagozzi, 
Pierro, & Mannetti, 2001; Mitchell, 2008). Partial disaggregation models are often 
preferred over total disaggregation models because they require smaller sample izes, are 
less vulnerable to measurement error and sample specificity, and because the score 
reliability for parcels tends to be higher than the score reliability of individual items 
(Kline, 2005; Leone et al., 2001).  
Since latent variables have a number of advantages over using a total item score 
as a manifest variable (Coffman & MacCullum, 2005), and since partial disaggregtion 
models have a number of advantages over total disaggregation models (Bagozzi & 
Heatherton, 1994; Leone et al., 2001; Kline, 2005), the current paper followed Mitchell’s 
(2008) procedure and used item parcels from the SPSRQ to create latent variables for BIS 
and BAS Sensitivity. The BIS Sensitivity latent variable (see Figure 4) was created from 
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four six-item Sensitivity to Punishment item parcels. Parcel one contained items 1, 3, 5, 
7, 9, and 11 from the SPSRQ (i.e., the first six items of the Sensitivity to Punishment 
scale), parcel two contained items 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, and 23, parcel three contained items 
25, 27, 29, 31, 33, and 35, and parcel four contained items 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, and 47. 
Similarly, the BAS Sensitivity latent variable was created from four six-item Sensitivity 
to Reward item parcels. Parcel one contained items 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 (i.e., the first six 
items of the Sensitivity to Reward scale); parcel two contained items 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 
and 24; parcel three contained items 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, and 36; parcel four contained 
items 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, and 48. This parceling procedure is identical to the one used by 
Mitchell (2008). It should also be noted that Mitchell demonstrated that randomly and 
non-randomly selected 6-item parcels from the SPSRQ performed equally well in a 
confirmatory factor analysis.  
Since multiple measures of cognitive bias and state social anxiety were available, 
the total scores from the relevant cognitive bias and social anxiety measures were used as 
the indicators for these latent variables. Specifically, the Cognitive Bias latent variable 
was constructed from the negative expectancy bias score, negative beliefs bias score, 
negative memory bias score, and the perception of threat score. The Social Anxietylatent 
variable was constructed from the total scores of the state anxiety measures, which 
included the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, the Negative Affect scale, the Beck Anxiety 
Inventory, and the Audience Rating of Anxiety score. Graphical representations of the 
measurement models are presented in Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
Confirmatory factor analysis was used to assess the fit of the proposed 
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measurement models to the data. Because “there is no single ‘magic index’ that provides 
a gold standard for all models” (Kline, 2005, p. 134), Kline has recommended that 
researchers always report the chi-square statistic, the Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and standardized root mean 
residual (SRMR) when reporting SEM results. Accordingly, these fit indices are reported 
for each of the measurement models evaluated (Table 12). Two other well-known fit 
indices—the Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) and the Normed Fit Index (NFI)—are also 
reported in Table 12 to provide a more comprehensive summary of the measurement 
models’ fit.  
Models that exhibit adequate fit to the data should have CFI, NFI, and GFI values 
that are greater than .90, RMSEA values that are below .08, and SRMR values that are 
below .10 (Kline, 2005). Theoretically, the p-values for the chi-square statistic should be 
above .05 (i.e., non-significant) for well-fitting models; however, the chi-square st tistic 
is problematic because of its extreme sensitivity to sample size (Kline, 2005). Thus, it is 
common for the chi-square statistic to be well below .05 in large samples for models that 
would be considered to have good fit by all other standards. As can be seen in Table 12, 
using Kline’s (2005) suggested guidelines, each of the measurement models exhibited 
excellent fit to the data (p > .05, RMSEA < .06, SRMR < .03, GFI > .99, NFI > .98, CFI 
> .99 for each model). Accordingly, no adjustments were made to the measurement 
portion of the model. 
 Structural portion of the model. Kline’s (2005) guidelines for interpreting 
goodness-of-fit indices were also used to evaluate the overall fit of the hypothesized 
 
48 
model and several competing models; however, in addition to reporting the fit statistics 
noted above (i.e., chi-square statistic, RMSEA, CFI, GFI, NFI), the 90% confidence 
intervals for the RMSEA values were also reported, as both Byrne (2001) and Kline 
(2005) have advocated that these statistics convey important information as well. 
Specifically, Kline (2005) has argued that models should not be rejected if the lower 
bound of the 90% RMSEA confidence interval is less than or equal to .05 and the upper 
bound of the 90% RMSEA confidence interval is less than or equal to .10. The Aikeke 
Information Criterion (AIC) index is also reported for each of the structural models, as 
this and other predictive fit indices can be used to compare nonhierarchical modelsthat 
have been estimated with the same data. In these types of situations, models with lower 
AIC values should be preferred over models with higher AIC values (Kline, 2005).   
The hypothesized model, which was constructed to test the hypothesis that 
Cognitive Biases for negative and threatening social information fully mediate the effect 
of BIS and BAS Sensitivity on Social Anxiety under conditions of imminent social threat, 
is shown in Figure 8 with the standardized maximum likelihood estimates. As can be
seen in Table 13, with the exception of the chi-square statistic, all of the fit indices for the 
hypothesized model suggested good to adequate fit (Chi-Square = 173.82 (100), p < .001; 
RMSEA = .060; CFI = .954; NFI = .900; GFI = .900; SRMR = .064). In contrast, the null 
model of independence (Figure 9), which is a model that assumes that there are no 
correlations among the observed variables of interest, exhibited very poor fit t  the data 
(RMSEA > .08; SRMR > .10; GFI, NFI, and CFI < .90). Because the null model of 
independence exhibited poor fit to the data, it was rejected in favor of the better-fitting 
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hypothesized model.  
The hypothesized model (Figure 8) was compared to a latent model of 
independence next (Figure 10). In the latent model of independence, all of the structural 
relationships among the latent variables were constrained to be zero. As can be see in 
Table 13, the fit indices for the latent model of independence also indicated poor fit t  the 
data (RMSEA > .08; SRMR > .10; GFI, NFI, CFI < .90). Consequently, the latent model 
of independence was also rejected in favor of the better-fitting hypothesized model. 
Taken together, the poor fit statistics for the null model of independence and the latent 
model of independence strongly suggest that more elaborate models that take into 
account the structural relationships among the latent variables are required to adequately 
account for the data.  
Accordingly, the hypothesized model (Figure 8) was compared to an independent 
main effects model next. The independent main effects model (Figure 11) tested the 
competing hypothesis that BIS Sensitivity, BAS Sensitivity, and Cognitive Bias all 
exhibit direct effects upon Social Anxiety, but do so independently of one another. As 
can be seen in Table 13, the independent main effects model showed poor overall fit to 
the data (Chi-Square = 284.213 (101), p < .001; RMSEA = .094; CFI = .887; NFI = .837; 
GFI = .860; SRMR = .194) and in comparison to the hypothesized model (Chi-Square = 
173.82 (100), p < .001; RMSEA = .060; CFI = .954; NFI = .900; GFI = .900; SRMR = 
.064). Since the hypothesized model and the independent main effects model were not 
hierarchically related to one another, the chi-square difference test could not be used to 
directly compare the two models, as the chi-square difference test is not a valid test 
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statistic in these types of cases (Kline, 2005). Instead, AIC values should be compared 
when evaluating non-hierarchical models, and models with lower AIC values should be 
preferred over models with higher AIC values (Kline, 2005). As can be seen in Table 13, 
the AIC value for the hypothesized model (AIC = 245.82) was substantially smaller than 
the AIC value for the independent main effects model (AIC = 345.21). Accordingly, the 
independent main effects model was rejected in favor of the better-fitting hypothesized 
model.   
Next, the hypothesized model was compared to a partially-mediated model of 
social anxiety (Figure 12), which was constructed to test the competing hypothesis that 
Cognitive Bias only partially mediates the effect of BIS and BAS Sensitivity on Social 
Anxiety. As can be seen in Table 13, the fit statistics for the hypothesized model and the 
partial mediation model were nearly identical, despite the fact that the partial mediation 
model involved adding direct paths from BIS and BAS Sensitivity to Social Anxiety. 
Since the hypothesized model and the partial mediation model were hierarchically related 
to one another, a chi-square difference test was conducted to determine if adding the 
direct paths from BIS and BAS Sensitivity to Social Anxiety significantly improved the 
fit of the model. The chi-square difference statistic (χ2D) was calculated by subtracting the 
chi-square statistic of the partial mediation model [χ2 = 171.40 (98)] from the chi-square 
statistic of the hypothesized model [χ2 = 173.82 (100)]. The resulting chi-square 
difference statistic (χ2D = 2.72 (2), ns) indicated that adding direct paths from BIS and 
BAS Sensitivity to Social Anxiety did not significantly improve the overall fit of the 
model. Accordingly, the partial mediation model was rejected in favor of the more 
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parsimonious hypothesized model. Additional support for the hypothesized model comes 
from the finding that both of the direct paths that were added in the partial mediation 
model (BIS  Social Anxiety, β = .13, ns; BAS  Social Anxiety, β = -.03, ns) were 
non-significant (α = .05).  
A final model comparison was made between the hypothesized model and a 
competing model in which the path from BAS Sensitivity to Cognitive Bias was 
constrained to be zero. The BAS constrained model (Figure 13) was constructed to 
determine if estimating the direct path from BAS Sensitivity to Cognitive Bias 
significantly added to the overall fit of the model. This model seemed particully 
relevant given the fact that the path coefficients for the direct paths leading from BAS 
Sensitivity to Social Anxiety in both the independent main effects model (β = -.06, ns) 
and the partial mediation model (β = -.03, ns) had been non-significant.  
As can be seen in Table 13, the fit statistics for the Constrained BAS model (Chi-
Square = 182.89 (101), p < .001; RMSEA = .063; CFI = .949; NFI = .895; GFI = .895; 
SRMR = .073) were slightly worse than the fit statistics for the hypothesized model (Chi-
Square = 173.82 (100), p < .001; RMSEA = .060; CFI = .954; NFI = .900; GFI = .900; 
SRMR = .064), although they still suggested good fit to the data. Of note, whereas BIS 
and BAS had combined to account for 58% of the variance in Cognitive Bias in the 
hypothesized model, in the Constrained BAS model, BIS alone accounted for 55% of the 
variance in Cognitive Bias. This finding indicates that the effect of BIS on Cognitive Bias 
is substantially larger than the effect of BAS on Cognitive Bias.   
A chi-square difference test was conducted to determine if adding a path from 
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BAS Sensitivity to Cognitive Bias (i.e., the hypothesized model) significantly improved 
model fit. The chi-square difference statistic (χ2D) was calculated by subtracting the chi-
square statistic of the hypothesized model [χ2 = 173.82 (100)] from the chi-square statistic 
of the BAS constrained model [χ2 = 182.89 (101)]. The resulting chi-square difference 
statistic (χ2D = 9.07 (1), p > .005) indicated that the hypothesized model showed 
significantly better fit to the data. Accordingly, the BAS constrained model was rejected 
in favor of the better-fitting hypothesized model.  
In sum, the hypothesized model exhibited better overall fit to the data than did the 
null model of independence, the latent model of independence, the independent main 
effects model, the partial mediation model, and the BAS constrained model. Accordingly, 
each of these models was rejected in favor of the better-fitting hypothesized model 
(Figure 8), and only the hypothesized model was considered in the remaining analyses.  
Parameter estimates for the hypothesized model. Table 14 provides a summary of 
the factor loadings for the four latent variables in the hypothesized model, an  Table 15 
provides a summary of the direct and indirect effects, variances, and covariances for th  
hypothesized model. As can be seen in Table 14, the factor loadings for the four latent 
variables were generally high (i.e., β > .50). The lone exception to this pattern of results 
was the Social Anxiety  Audience-Rated Anxiety coefficient, which was moderate in 
size (β = .35, p < .001). With respect to the structural relationships among the latent 
variables, as predicted, both BIS (β = .71, p < .001) and BAS Sensitivity (β = -.20, p < 
.001) had significant direct effects upon Cognitive Bias, combining to account for 58% of 
the variance in this variable. In turn, Cognitive Bias had a substantial direct effect upon 
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Social Anxiety (β = .86, p < .001), accounting for 74% of the variance in this variable. In 
addition, as predicted by Kimbrel’s (2008) mediated model of social anxiety, both BIS (β
= .61) and BAS Sensitivity (β = -.17) had substantial indirect effects upon Social Anxiety 
via Cognitive Bias.  
To determine if these indirect path coefficients were statistically significant, 
Sobel’s (1982) products of coefficients test was calculated for each. As predicted, the 
indirect path from BIS Sensitivity  Cognitive Bias  Social Anxiety was statistically 
significant (z = 4.41, p < .001), providing the first direct support for Kimbrel’s (2008) 
hypothesis that cognitive biases for negative and threatening social information ediate 
the effect of BIS sensitivity on social anxiety under conditions of imminent social threat. 
The indirect path from BAS Sensitivity  Cognitive Bias  Social Anxiety was also 
statistically significant (z = -2.57, p = .01), providing the strongest evidence to date that 
low BAS sensitivity also plays a significant role in social anxiety.  
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
Overall, the results from the current study were highly consistent with the 
hypothesis that cognitive biases for negative and threatening social information ediate 
the effect of BIS and BAS sensitivity on social anxiety. Thus, as predicted, BIS 
sensitivity had a significant direct effect upon cognitive bias. In turn, cognitive bias was 
shown to be a robust predictor of social anxiety symptoms in response to a threatening 
social situation. A Sobel’s (1982) test confirmed that the indirect path from BIS to 
cognitive bias to social anxiety was significant, providing direct support for the 
hypothesis that cognitive biases for negative and threatening social information ediate 
the effect of BIS sensitivity on social anxiety symptoms.  
A secondary purpose of the current study was to explore whether low BAS 
sensitivity also played a significant role in social anxiety. As predicted, low BAS 
sensitivity also had a significant indirect effect upon social anxiety via cognitive bias, 
even after accounting for shared variance with BIS sensitivity. This finding is important 
because it provides direct support for the hypothesis that low BAS sensitivity represents 
an additional risk factor for social anxiety (Corr, 2002; Kimbrel, 2008) and because it 
suggests that the effect of low BAS on social anxiety is also mediated by a cognitive bias 
for negative and threatening social information.  
Taken together, these results suggest that personality and cognition are strongly 
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related to one another, and they highlight the need for more interdisciplinary research in 
this emerging area of study. The findings are also important because they provide the first 
direct support for Kimbrel’s (2008) mediated model of social anxiety and suggest that 
cognitive biases for negative and threatening social information may be the mec anism 
through which BIS and BAS sensitivity exert their influence upon social anxiety. While 
more research is needed to replicate these findings, the current results are exciting 
because they suggest a personality/neurobiological basis for both social anxiety d the 
cognitive biases associated with this condition. The findings are also of broad interest 
because they suggest that biased information processing may be the mechanism t rough 
which personality influences behavioral responses to specific situations.  
 
Research Implications 
The current findings help to extend the existing literature in a number of 
important ways. First, this study adds to the growing literature concernig the 
relationship between BIS sensitivity and social anxiety by demonstrating that BIS 
sensitivity is predictive of state social anxiety within the context of an ecologically-valid 
social situation. Given that public-speaking situations are the most commonly feared 
situations among individuals diagnosed with social phobia (e.g., Cox, Clara, Sareen, & 
Stein, 2008; Ruscio et al., 2008), the current study helps to extend previous work on BIS 
sensitivity and trait social anxiety (e.g., Coplan et al., 2006; Kashdan & Roberts, 2006; 
Kimbrel et al., 2008) by establishing a relationship between BIS and state social anxiety 
within the context of a realistic and relevant social situation. An additional strength of the 
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study is its inclusion of the Audience-Rated Anxiety scale within the social anxiety latent 
variable. The inclusion of this variable adds to the validity of the findings by 
demonstrating that the results are unlikely to be due to self-report bias.   
The current study also adds to the large body of work examining the relationship 
between social anxiety and cognitive bias (e.g., Amir et al., 1998; Asmundson & Stein, 
1994; Breck & Smith, 1983; Leary et al., 1988; Lucock & Salkovskis, 1988, Mansell & 
Clark, 1999; Stopa & Clark, 1993, 2000) by demonstrating a cognitive bias for negative 
and threatening social information among socially-anxious individuals in response to a 
public-speaking situation. This finding is consistent with previous research and provies 
additional support for the cognitive model of social anxiety (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
The current study also adds to our understanding of the nature of cognitive bias by
demonstrating that some forms of cognitive bias (i.e., beliefs, expectancies, memory bias, 
perception of threat) load onto a more general cognitive bias factor. This finding s 
consistent with Gray and McNaughton’s (2000) proposal that there is a major biasing 
system in the brain (i.e., the BIS) that underlies many forms of cognitive bias. In addition, 
the more general finding that there is a strong relationship between personality, cognition, 
and emotion is consistent with Gray’s (1990) observation that “the brain system 
mediating emotion overlap with those mediating cognition to such a degree that it is 
difficult to maintain any clear distinction between them” (p. 269). 
The current findings also add to our understanding of the differential relationships 
among biologically-based personality traits and cognitive bias. Specifically, as predicted, 
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BIS sensitivity was shown to be the RST-based personality trait most strongly associated 
with negative cognitive bias. Indeed, while the results of the SEM analyses indicated that 
both BIS and BAS uniquely contributed to the prediction of negative cognitive bias, the 
results also clearly indicated that BIS was the stronger predictor of thetwo. For example, 
in the model in which the effect of BAS on cognitive bias was constrained to be zero, BIS 
sensitivity alone accounted for 55% of the variance in the cognitive bias factor. Adding 
the path from BAS to bias in the hypothesized model only increased the total amount of 
variance accounted for in the cognitive bias factor by about 3%; however, this path was 
significant and it did improve the overall fit of the model. Thus, it appears that while BIS 
sensitivity is the primary RST-based personality trait that underlies negativ  cognitive 
bias, BAS sensitivity also plays a significant role.  
The correlational analyses also revealed differences between BIS and BAS in 
relation to the cognitive measures. For example, BIS sensitivity was correlated more 
highly with each of the nine cognitive measures than was BAS, providing additional 
evidence that BIS sensitivity is the RST-based personality trait most strngly associated 
with negative cognitive bias. The results concerning the differential relationships between 
BIS, BAS, and the different types of cognitive bias are also of interest. For example, 
whereas the relationship between BAS sensitivity and negative memory bias was non-
significant (r = -.08, ns), BIS demonstrated a significant positive correlation with this 
variable (r = .42, p < .01).  While this pattern of results could simply be a reflection of the 
more general pattern of stronger relationships between BIS sensitivity and negative bias 
scores, it is also consistent with the idea that heightened BIS activation—especially 
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hypersensitivity in the hippocampus—is the primary neural basis for negative memory 
bias (Gray & McNaughton, 2000).   
It is also worth noting that the current study is one of the few to demonstrate an 
explicit memory bias for negative and threatening social information among socially-
anxious participants. Equally important is the finding that most of the previous studies 
that have found a memory bias among socially-anxious participants have also employed a 
social-threat manipulation (e.g., Breck & Smith, 1983; Lundh & Ost, 1996b; Mansell & 
Clark, 1999). In contrast, the majority of studies that have failed to find a memory bias 
(e.g., Cloitre et al., 1995; Rapee et al., 1994) have not. Thus, the findings from the current 
study are highly consistent with previous research and with Hirsch and Clark’s (2004) 
observation that memory biases are most likely to occur among socially-anxious 
participants following a social threat manipulation. The current findings are also 
consistent with the hypothesis that potentially-threatening social situations should 
produce the most pronounced information-processing biases because these types of 
situations should engage the BIS and force it into control mode (Gray & McNaughton, 
2000).  Once in control mode, the BIS should begin to engage in both internal (i.e., 
memory bias) and external scanning (i.e., attention bias) for threat cues. While the results 
are consistent with this hypothesis, experimental research that includes a control
condition in which some participants do not receive a social threat manipulation is 
needed to provide the most stringent test of this hypothesis.  
An additional point of interest is the finding that both BIS and BAS sensitivity 
were associated with the “higher-level” cognitive biases (i.e., expectancy and belief bias) 
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that were measured in the current study. As noted in the introduction, Gray and 
McNaughton (2000) have reported that the septo-hippocampal system (a major 
component of the BIS) sends simple feedback signals to other areas of the brain, 
including higher level goal processing areas, like the prefrontal cortex. Furthermore, Gray 
and McNaughton (2000) have proposed that the function of these feedback signals is to 
increase the valence of threatening information in these areas of the brain. Building upon 
this idea, Kimbrel (2008) proposed that this biasing process might be the neural substrate 
underlying negative beliefs and expectancies. Interestingly, the prefrontal c rtex is 
proposed to be a major component of both the BIS and BAS (Corr, 2004; Gray & 
McNaughton, 2000; McNaughton & Corr, 2006). Thus, one explanation for the observed 
relationship between BAS sensitivity and negative expectancies and beliefs is that this 
component of the BAS overlaps substantially with the BIS and would be most likely to 
be affected by this biasing process. In contrast, since the hippocampus is not proposed t  
play a substantial role in the BAS (Corr, 2004; Gray, 1994), BAS sensitivity would be 
expected to have little or no relationship with negative memory bias. While highly 
speculative at the current time, this explanation is consistent with current theory and 
should be addressed in future research.  
Finally, the differential relationships between BIS, BAS, and the positive and 
negative measures of cognition are of interest. Specifically, the current findi gs indicate 
that BIS sensitivity is associated with increased negative thinking (as evidenced by the 
positive correlations among BIS and the negative cognitive scores) and decreased 
positive thinking (as evidenced by the negative correlations between BIS and positive 
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cognitive scores). Conversely, BAS sensitivity appears to be associated with increased 
positive thinking and decreased negative thinking. While previous studies have 
demonstrated that BIS sensitivity is associated with more negative thinking (e.g., 
Noguchi et al., 2006; Gomez & Gomez, 2006), the current study is one of the first to 
demonstrate that BIS sensitivity is also associated with less positive th nking. Similarly, 
while previous studies have demonstrated a relationship between BAS and positive 
thinking (e.g., Noguchi et al., 2006; Gomez & Gomez, 2006), the current study is one of 
the first to demonstrate that heightened BAS sensitivity is also associated with less 
negative thinking.  
These results suggest the presence of strong antagonistic and facilitory 
relationships between BIS and BAS at the cognitive level. Given that the current study 
also demonstrates a strong relationship between negative cognition and social anxiety, it 
is reasonable to infer that the proposed facilitory effect of low BAS sensitivity on social 
anxiety is ultimately due to the facilitory effect of low BAS sensitivity on negative 
cognitive bias. Taken together, these results provide additional support for Kimbrel’s 
(2008) mediated model of social anxiety and for a modified version of the joint-
subsystems hypothesis (Corr, 2002) in which the proposed antagonistic and facilitory 
effects of BIS and BAS on behavior are mediated via cognitive bias. While Corr (2002) 
did not specify a mediating role for cognitive biases when he argued that BIS and BAS 
have antagonistic and facilitory effects upon behavior, this modified version of the j int-
subsystems hypothesis may be a more accurate description of the interplay hat occurs 
between BIS and BAS in response to threatening stimuli. 
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Clinical Implications 
There are also a number of important clinical implications that emerge from the 
current study. First, a number of researchers have noted that the emotional disorders (i.e., 
anxiety disorders and unipolar depression) exhibit considerable overlap with one anoth r 
(e.g., Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill, 2001; Wittchen et al., 1999).  For 
instance, Brown et al. (2001) reported that 76% of individuals diagnosed with an anxiety 
disorder also met lifetime criteria for at least one additional anxiety or depressive 
disorder. One explanation for the high rates of comorbidity among the emotional 
disorders is that there may be a more general “negative affect syndrome” that 
encompasses all of the emotional disorders (Barlow, 2002; Moses & Barlow, 2006). 
Given the results of the current study, as well as the consistent findings concerning the 
relationship between BIS sensitivity and emotional disorders in the literatur (e.g., 
Johnson et al., 2003), a competing explanation for these findings is that high BIS 
sensitivity is the biological/personality basis for the emotional disorders in general and 
the cognitive biases that are associated with these types of disorders. 
The latter explanation has several advantages. First, it provides a theoretical 
rationale for the development of emotional disorders and for the cognitive biases th t 
underlie these disorders (e.g., Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Kimbrel, 2008) that can be 
used to help clinicians and researchers alike to conceptualize the development and 
treatment of emotional disorders at multiple levels of analysis. This explanation is also 
consistent with the growing evidence that the emotional disorders are associated with BIS 
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sensitivity (e.g., Hundt, Nelson-Gray, Kimbrel, Mitchell, & Kwapil, 2007; Johnsn, 
Turner, & Iwata, 2003; Kimbrel, Nelson-Gray, & Mitchell, 2007; Kimbrel et al., 2008) 
and other closely-related measures of personality, such as neuroticism (e.g., Bienvenu et 
al., 2004; Marteinsdottir, Tillfors, Furmark, Anderberg, & Ekselius, 2003; Stemberger t 
al., 1995; Watson, Gameza, & Simms, 2005).   
The proposal that heightened BIS sensitivity is the basis for the emotional 
disorders in general is also consistent with previous research demonstrating that the
emotional disorders share a common genetic basis with one another and with the 
personality trait of neuroticism (e.g., Andrews, Stewart, Allen, & Henderson, 1990; 
Hettema et al., 2006).  It is also consistent with the evidence gathered from this study and 
others like it (e.g., Derryberry & Reed, 1994; Gomez & Gomez, 2006; Lam et al., 2003; 
Langston & Sykes, 1997; Windsor et al., 2008) demonstrating that both BIS and 
neuroticism are associated with a cognitive bias for negative and threatening information. 
A final advantage of this proposal is that it does not require the development of 
new categories, new diagnostic criteria, or new assessment devices. Moreover, clinicians 
could easily inform their assessment and conceptualization efforts by simply including 
basic RST measures like the SPSRQ in their assessment batteries. An additio l 
advantage is that the two most widely-used RST measures (i.e., Carver & White, 1994; 
Torrubia et al., 2001) are in the public domain and are free to anyone. In contrast, most of
the personality measures currently used in clinical settings cost a significant amount of 
money to buy and administer.  
Another clinical implication that emerges from the current paper concerns the 
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cognitive mediation hypothesis. As noted by Garratt, Ingram, Rand, and Sawalani (2007), 
two of the primary assumptions that underlie cognitive therapy are that: (a) cognitive 
changes are associated with therapeutic improvement, and that (b) changes in cognition 
are specific to cognitive therapy. In contrast, Kimbrel’s (2008) model proposes that 
cognitive changes are not specific to cognitive therapy. Instead, this modelpr poses that 
cognitive therapy, behavior therapy, and pharmacological therapy are all capable of 
decreasing cognitive biases because each of these forms of treatment is proposed to be 
capable of decreasing BIS sensitivity. While each form of treatment was proposed to 
decrease BIS sensitivity through a different mechanism (see Kimbrel, 2008, for a more 
thorough discussion), in each case, successful treatment was ultimately proposed to be a 
function of change in BIS sensitivity to social stimuli.  
While the results from the current study are unable to provide direct support for 
this hypothesis, they do clearly demonstrate a link between heightened BIS sensitivity, 
cognitive bias, and social anxiety. Additional support for this proposal comes from the 
finding that both behavior therapy and pharmacological treatment are capable of 
decreasing cognitive bias in social phobia (Gould, Buckminster, Pollack, Otto, & Yap, 
1997; Harmer, Shelley, Cowen, & Goodwin, 2004; Stravynski, Bond, & Amado, 2004) 
and depression (DeRubeis et al., 1990; Jacobsen et al., 1996; McKnight, Nelson-Gray, & 
Barnhill, 1992; Simons, Garfield, & Murphy, 1984). Moreover, successful treatment 
change in social phobia has been shown to be associated with decreased activation in core 
components of the BIS (i.e., amygdala, hippocampus, prefrontal cortex), regardless of 
whether patients were treated with cognitive-behavioral therapy or citalopram (Furmark 
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et al., 2002). Thus, while the results in the current study do not provide direct support for 
the hypothesis that decreased social anxiety symptoms are ultimately the result of 
decreased BIS sensitivity, they are consistent with this proposal.  
Finally, the findings from the current study highlight the prevalence of social 
anxiety among “non-clinical” populations. Indeed, 24% of the undergraduate participan s 
in the current study scored at or above the established clinical cut-off score of 24 on the 
Social Phobia Scale (Heimberg et al., 1992). Because the current study did not employ 
formal diagnostic procedures and did not assess for functional impairment, it is 
impossible to determine the exact percentage of participants who met full criteria for 
social phobia. Nevertheless, these findings strongly suggest that social anxiety is 
widespread, even among relatively high-functioning populations. 
Given the increased emphasis on public-speaking and other oral communication 
skills in both academic and occupational settings (e.g., Becker & Eckdom, 1980; 
Emanuel, 2007; Harrell & Harrell, 1984; Morreale, Osborne, & Pearson, 2000; Winsor, 
Curtis, & Stephens, 1997), the potential for significant distress and functional impairment 
among socially-anxious individuals is obvious. For example, Becker and Eckdom (1980) 
reported that there is considerable evidence that speaking skills are more imp tant than 
specific technical skills in terms of overall job success. Similarly, the results of a 20-year 
longitudinal study of graduates from the Stanford MBA program indicate that no skill is 
more important to a successful business career than good communication skills 
(Emanuel, 2007; Harrell & Harrell, 1984).  
Taken together, these findings suggest that while public-speaking and other oral 
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communication skills are critical for long-term success, a substantial proportion f 
individuals experience significant anxiety and distress when asked to perform these very 
same skills. These findings highlight the need for increased research into treatment and 
prevention programs for individuals with both clinical and sub-clinical levels of social 
anxiety. These findings also provide additional support for Furmark et al.’s (1999, p. 416) 
conclusion that “although the exact diagnostic boundaries for social phobia are difficult 
to determine, it can be concluded that social anxiety is a distressing problem f r a 
considerable proportion of the population.” 
 
Study Limitations 
The current study had a number of limitations that should be acknowledged. First, 
it employed a non-clinical sample. While this type of approach does reduce the 
confounds associated with current psychopathology, it also limits the generalizability of 
the results. Future studies should consider including clinical participants as well. Giv n 
that the results of the current study clearly indicate that social anxiety, personality, and 
cognitive bias are all dimensional constructs, future studies might consider using mixed 
samples that include clinical participants with formal diagnoses and non-clinical 
participants from community samples. This type of approach would allow for the tesing 
of dimensional models while also enhancing the generalizability of the results. The 
current study also relied heavily upon self-report measures. Future studies might consider 
including physiological and behavioral measures in addition to self-report measures in 
order to overcome this limitation.  
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The current study was also correlational in nature. While the study design (.g., 
establishing temporal priority of BIS before bias and social anxiety) was consistent with 
the hypothesis that cognitive biases mediate the effect of BIS sensitivity on social 
anxiety, the absence of an experimental manipulation precludes any causal inferences. 
Similarly, the lack of a control group for the social threat manipulation prevents direct
examination of the effect of this variable on cognitive bias. Kimbrel (2008) predicted that 
cognitive biases (especially memory and attention bias) would be most pronounced under 
conditions of imminent social threat because these conditions should activate both the 
BIS and FFFS. While this study confirms that cognitive biases can occur under these 
conditions, the design of the study prevents a direct test of the hypothesis that cognitive 
biases are more pronounced under these conditions than under conditions of no threat. 
Experimental research is needed to fully address this question. 
Finally, while the overall findings from the current study support the role of 
cognitive biases in social anxiety, it is important to note that the attention measure scores 
were not related to any of the other study variables and could not be used as planned in 
the hypothesized model. This finding could be interpreted as evidence that an attention 
bias for negative and threatening social information does not exist among socially-
anxious individuals. However, as noted in the introduction, there is substantial evidence 
that such a bias does exist (e.g., Amir & Foa, 2001; Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Becker, et 
al.,  2001; Hope et al., 1990; Lundh & Ost, 1996a; Mattia et al.,1993) and that it is related 
to hypersensitivity in the amygdala (Fox, Hane, & Pine, 2007; Hariri et al., 2005), a 
primary component of the BIS; however, none of the previous studies that have found an 
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attention bias among socially-anxious participants used the Embedded Word Task. In 
fact, the current study appears to have been the first to have used the Embedded Word 
Task in relation to social anxiety. The current study also used a modified version of the 
Embedded Word Task. Whereas previous studies (Wezlaff et al., 2001) that have 
employed this task instructed participants to remember a lengthy number whil  they 
completed the task in order to put them in a state of cognitive load, the current study did 
not use the cognitive load procedure because Kimbrel (2008) specifically hypothesized 
that social threat alone should be sufficient to induce a cognitive bias for negative and 
threatening social information.  
Given these facts, a competing explanation for the attention task’s null results is 
that the modified version of the Embedded Word Task may have simply been an invalid 
measure of attention bias. Another potential explanation for the null results is that 
cognitive load, but not social threat, induces attention bias for negative and threatening 
social information; however, given that attention biases have been reported among social 
phobics under conditions of no social threat and no cognitive load (e.g., Hope et al., 
1990), a more likely explanation is that the modified Embedded Word Task used in the 
current study was simply not a valid measure of attention bias. Unfortunately, the null 
findings and the modified procedure are confounded within the same study, which makes 
it impossible to determine the true cause of these results. These findings highlight the 
importance of using reliable and well-validated measures whenever possible. In addition, 
they suggest the need for additional research aimed at developing a reliable and valid 
attention-bias measure that can be administered quickly and used with socially-anxious 
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participants in a group format.  
 
Future Directions for Research 
The current findings point to a number of important directions for future research. 
First, given the novelty of the current findings, future studies are needed to replicate these 
results using different samples and different methodologies. In particular, it is 
recommended that different types of memory tasks (e.g., facial recognition tasks), 
attention tasks (e.g., dot-probe tasks), and social-threat manipulations (e.g., one-on-one 
interactions with a stranger) be used in future research. Future research would also 
benefit from multi-method assessment of BIS sensitivity. For instance, in addition to self-
reports, neuroimaging and/or behavioral tasks could be used to enhance the validity of the 
current findings. Future studies might also consider using a pre-post design in which BIS 
sensitivity, cognitive bias, and social anxiety symptoms are assessed before and after 
some form of treatment (e.g., cognitive-behavioral therapy or medication) to determine if 
decreases in social anxiety and cognitive bias are a direct function of decreas s in BIS 
sensitivity. Finally, additional research examining the relationship between BIS 
sensitivity, other forms of cognitive bias (e.g., rumination), and other types of 
psychological disorders is needed, as the available data suggest that heightened BIS 
sensitivity is associated with a wide range of psychological problems (e.g., Hundt et al., 
2007; Johnson et al., 2003; Kane, Loxton, Staiger, & Dawe, 2004; Kimbrel, Nelson-Gray, 
et al., 2007; Kimbrel et al., 2008).  
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Conclusion 
In sum, the results from the current study provide strong support for Kimbrel’s 
(2008) mediated model of social anxiety. As predicted, high BIS and low BAS both had 
significant direct effects upon cognitive bias, which, in turn, was a robust predictor of 
state anxiety in response to a threatening social situation. Additional support for this 
model comes from the finding that the indirect paths from BIS and BAS sensitivity to 
social anxiety were both statistically significant. Moreover, the hypothesized model 
showed significantly better fit to the data than did several alternative mod ls. Taken 
together, these results provide strong support for a mediated model of social anxiety d 
suggest that cognitive biases for negative and threatening social information may be the 
mechanism through which BIS and BAS sensitivity exert their influence upon social
anxiety.
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Appendix A 
TABLES 
Table 1 
 
Summary of the Sample Demographic Information    
 
Variable Classification Frequency Percentage 
    
Gender    
 Male 69 33% 
 Female 138 67% 
Ethnicity    
 Euro-American 145 70% 
 African-American 39 19% 
 Asian-American 9 4% 
 Hispanic-American 3 2% 
 Other 9 4% 
 Missing 2 1% 
College 
Standing    
 Freshman 153 74% 
 Sophomore 38 18% 
 Junior 8 4% 
 Senior 6 3% 
 Other 1 <1% 
    
    
Variable  Mean SD 
    
Age  19.1 5.8 
 GPA  3.3 .59 
 
Note: GPA = grade point average; SD = standard deviation. 
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Table 2 
Word Lists used in the Free Recall Task        
NEGATIVE WORDS POSITIVE WORDS BUFFER WORDS 
DULL ARTICULATE POISED 
FRIGHTENED ATTRACTIVE SUCCESSFUL 
INADEQUATE BRILLIANT EFFICIENT 
INSECURE CALM VIVACIOUS 
NERVOUS CHEERFUL IMMATURE 
PATHETIC COMPETENT INEPT 
RIDICULOUS COMPOSED UNINSPIRING 
SCARED CONFIDENT OBNOXIOUS 
SILLY DYNAMIC  
STRESSED EAGER  
SWEATY HUMOROUS  
TENSE INTELLIGENT  
UGLY PLEASANT  
UNCOMFORTABLE RELAXED  
WORRIED WITTY  
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Table 3 
Word Lists used in the Embedded Word Task       
NEGATIVE WORDS POSITIVE WORDS NEUTRAL WORDS 
AWKWARD ACHIEVE SHIP 
BAD CAPABLE STORE 
BLUSH CLEVER VOTE 
BORING FUN TRACK 
REJECT GLAD UNCLE 
DUMB GRIN CARPET 
FOOL HAPPY CHERRY 
FAIL PRAISE OPERA 
INSULT PROUD MARBLE 
STUPID SMART PURPLE 
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Table 4 
Summary of the Procedures and Measures             
 
Time Point Procedure Corresponding Measures and Tasks 
   
1 Overview of the study and consent procedure a. Consent form 
   
2 Completion of the initial packets (counter-balanced) b. Demographic form 
  
c. Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward 
Questionnaire 
  d. Social Phobia Scale 
   
3 Social-threat induction procedure e. Speech topics form 
   
4 Cognitive battery (counter-balanced) f. Incidental free-recall task 
  g. Embedded-word task 
  h. Speech Expectancies Scale 
  i. Self-Statements During Public-Speaking Scale 
  j. Perception of threat rating 
   
5 State anxiety battery (counter-balanced) k. State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
  l.   Beck Anxiety Inventory  
  m. Negative Affect scale 
   
6 Speech task n. Audience Rated Anxiety Scale 
  o. Public-Speaking Performance Rating Scale 
   
7 Debriefing procedure p. Debriefing form provided to participants to take with them 
  
q. Copy of consent form provided to participants to take with 
them 
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Table 5 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach’s Alphas      
 
Measure Mean SD Alpha 
    
1. Sensitivity to Punishment subscale (BIS sensitivity) 10.7 5.5 .85 
2. Sensitivity to Reward subscale (BAS sensitivity) 12.2 4.4 .78 
3. Social Phobia Scale 17.4 13.4 .93 
4. Beck Anxiety Inventory 14.9 13.2 .95 
5. Negative Affect 20.2 7.7 .88 
6. State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (State Version) 47.1 15.1 .96 
7. Negative Self-Statements 11.4 6.4 .85 
8. Positive Self-Statements 13.3 4.3 .80 
9. Negative Speech Expectancies 8.6 2.9 .80 
10. Positive Speech Expectancies 7.9 2.7 .82 
11. Audience-Rated Anxiety (Average)* 2.4 .65  
12. Perceived Threat* 2.9 1.3  
13. Negative Words Recalled* 3.4 1.6  
14. Positive Words Recalled* 3.3 1.9  
15. Negative EWT Words Found* 2 1.2  
16. Positive EWT Words Found* 1.6 1.2  
17. Neutral EWT Words Found* 1.6 1.2  
 
Note: *Measures 11 – 17 are not appropriate for the calcul tion of internal consistency because they contain only one 
score. Accordingly, only means and standard deviations are reported for these measures. EWT = Embedded word task.  
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for Cognitive Bias Scores       
Measure Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
     
1. Negative Belief Bias Score -20 25 -1.8 9.7 
2. Negative Expectancy Bias Score -12 12 .68 5.3 
3. Negative Memory Bias Score -6 7 .05 2.5 
4. Negative Attention Bias Score -4 4 .36 1.4 
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Table 7 
Correlations among the Primary Predictor Variables      
Measures 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       
1. BIS sensitivity -.11 .57** .49** .42** .00 .54** 
2. BAS sensitivity -- -.23** -.28** -.08 -.06 -.15* 
3. Negative Belief Bias  -- .74** .41** .03 .68** 
4. Negative Expectancy Bias   -- .38** .07 .62** 
5. Negative Memory Bias    -- .10 .42** 
6. Negative Attention Bias     -- -.06 
7. Perceived Threat      -- 
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Table 8 
Correlations with the Attention Task Variables           
Measures 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
              
1.  Negative EWT  
     Words Found .29**  .62**  .03 -.05 -.03 -.01 .04 -.02 .07 -.01 -.01 .04 -.07 
2.  Positive EWT  
     Words Found -- .58**  .04 .04 -.07 -.10 -.08 .05 .04 -.01 -.02 .00 -.08 
3.  Attention           
     Bias Score  -- .00 -.06 .04 .07 .10 -.06 .03 -.01 .00 .03 
 
.01 
4.  BIS 
     Sensitivity   -- -.11 .59**  .50**  .43**  .55**  .64**  .59**  .53**  .61**  .32**  
5.  BAS 
     Sensitivity    -- -.23**  -.28**  -.08 -.15* -.15* -.10 -.13 -.28**  -.13 
6.  Beliefs 
     Bias Score     -- .77**  .43**  .70**  .53**  .59**  .73**  .77**  .37**  
7.  Expectancy  
     Bias Score      -- .39**  .63**  .38**  .45**  .59**  .72**  .41**  
8.  Memory     
     Bias Score       -- .44**  .40**  .38**  .40**  .44**  .29**  
9.  Perceived  
     Threat        -- .53**  .53**  .57**  .65**  .34**  
10. Social Phobia    
      Scale         -- .63**  .58**  .60**  .27* 
11. Beck Anxiety    
      Inventory          -- .77**  .71**  .28**  
12. Negative          
      Affect           -- .87**  .31**  
13. State-Trait    
      Anxiety Inventory            -- .36**  
14. Audience-Rated  
      Anxiety             -- 
 
Note: * p < .01, **  p < .001; EWT = Embedded word task.  
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Table 9 
Correlations among Personality and Cognitive Bias Variables         
 
Measures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          
1. BIS Sensitivity -- -.11 .28**  .56**  .43**  .54**  -.31**  -.46**  -.49**  
2. BAS Sensitivity  -- -.02 -.17* -.23**  -.15* .10 .27**  .30**  
3. Negative Memory Score   -- .29**  .17* .24**  .01 -.23**  -.24**  
4. Negative Beliefs Score    -- .68**  .65**  -.33
**  -.62**  -.62**  
5. Negative Expectancy Score     -- .61**  -.30
**  -.55**  -.73**  
6. Perceived Threat      -- -.35**  -.56
**  -.55**  
7. Positive Memory Score       -- .16* .29**  
8. Positive Beliefs Score        -- .61**  
9. Positive Expectancy Score         -- 
                 
Note: * p < .01, **  p < .001; 
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Table 10 
Correlations among the Criterion Variables            
Measures 1 2 3 4 5 
      
1. Social Phobia Scale -- .63** .58** .60** .27** 
2. Beck Anxiety Inventory  -- .77** .71** .28** 
3. Negative Affect   -- .87** .31** 
4. State-Trait Anxiety Inventory    -- .36** 
5. Audience-Rated Anxiety     -- 
 
Note: ** p < .01. 
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Table 11 
Correlations among the Predictor and Criterion Variables           
Measures 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
           
1. BIS Sensitivity -.11 .57** .49** .42** .54** .63** .58** .49** .57** .28** 
2. BAS Sensitivity -- -.23** -.28** -.08 -.15* -.15* -.10 -.13 -.28** -.13 
3. Negative Belief Bias  -- .74** .41** .68** .49** .57** .66** .71** .34** 
4. Negative Expectancy    -- .38** .62** .35** .43** .54** .67** .37** 
5. Negative Memory Bias    -- .42** .37** .37** .35** .41** .26** 
6. Perceived Threat     -- .51** .51** .54** .62** .31** 
7. Social Phobia Scale      -- .58** .51** .54** .23* 
8. Beck Anxiety Inventory       -- .68** .67** .26** 
9. Negative Affect        -- .81** .26** 
10.State-Trait Anxiety          -- .32** 
11.Audience-Rated Anx.          -- 
 
Note: * p < .01, ** p < .001. 
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Table 12 
 
Fit Statistics for the Measurement Models             
 
 
 (p > .05)  
 
(<.08) (<.10) 
 
(>.90) 
 
(>.90) 
 
(>.90) 
Model 
Chi-
Square p-value df RMSEA SRMR GFI NFI CFI 
         
BIS Sensitivity Measurement Model 3.41 .18 2 .058 .018 .992 .984 .993 
BAS Sensitivity Measurement Model 3.41 .18 2 .058 .023 .992 .984 .993 
Cognitive Bias Measurement Model 2.75 .25 2 .043 .020 .993 .992 .998 
State Anxiety Measurement Model  2.46 .29 2 .034 .022 .994 .994 .999 
 
Note: Cut-offs for acceptable fit are listed above the respective goodness-of-fit indices in parentheses. These cut-offs are based on Kline’s (2005)  
recommendations; df = degrees of freedom; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = Stand rdized Root Mean Square 
Residual; GFI = Goodness-of-Fit Index; NFI = Normed Fit Index; CFI = Comparative Fit Index. 
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Table 13 
 
Summary of the Fit Statistics for the Models             
 
 
Model 
Chi-
Square df 
(<.08) 
RMSEA 
Low 
90% 
High 
90% 
(<.10) 
SRMR 
(>.90) 
GFI 
(>.90) 
NFI 
(>.90) 
CFI AIC 
           
Hypothesized Model 173.82 100 .060 .045 .075 .064 .900 .900 .954 245.82 
Null Model of Independence 1740.33 120 .256 .245 .267 .3584 .314 .000 .000 1772.33 
Latent Model of Independence 475.99 104 .132 .120 .144 .2783 .782 .726 .770 539.992 
Independent Main Effects Model 284.213 101 .094 .081 .107 .1941 .860 .837 .887 354.21 
Partial Mediation Model 171.40 98 .060 .045 .075 .063 .902 .902 .955 247.40 
BAS Constrained Model 182.89 101 .063 .048 .077 .0725 .895 .895 .949 252.89 
 
Note: Cut-offs for acceptable fit are listed above the respective goodness-of-fit indices in parentheses. These cut-offs are based on Kline’s (2005) recommendations; df = degrees of 
freedom; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; Low 90% = Lower confidence interval for RMSEA; High 90% = Higher confidence interval for RMSEA; SRMR 
= Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; GFI = Goodness-of-Fit Index; NFI = Normed Fit Index; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion. 
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Table 14 
 
Summary of the Factor Loadings for the Hypothesized Model     
 
Parameter Unstandardized SE Standardized 
p-
value 
     
BIS  sp1 1.000 -- .695 *** 
BIS  sp2 1.281 .126 .815 *** 
BIS  sp3 1.101 .119 .729 *** 
BIS  sp4 1.341 .137 .774 *** 
     
BAS  sr1 1.000 -- .620 *** 
BAS  sr2 1.202 .175 .630 *** 
BAS  sr3 1.126 .152 .709 *** 
BAS  sr4 1.511 .197 .769 *** 
     
Cognitive Bias  memory bias 1.000 -- .499 *** 
Cognitive Bias  perceived threat .818 .116 .771 *** 
Cognitive Bias  expectancy bias 3.448 .477 .807 *** 
Cognitive Bias  belief bias 6.806 .911 .883 *** 
     
Social Anxiety  BAI 1.000 -- .740 *** 
Social Anxiety  NA .663 .052 .867 *** 
Social Anxiety  STAI 1.465 .109 .931 *** 
Social Anxiety  ARA .021 .004 .351 *** 
             
Note: *** p < .001; SE = Standard error; sp1 – sp4 = Sensitivity to Punishment parcels; sr1 – sr4 = Sensitivity to 
Reward parcels; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State Version; NA = 
Negative Affect;  ARA = Audience Rated Anxiety.   
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Table 15 
 
Summary of the Parameter Estimates for the Hypothesized Model    
Parameter Unstandardized SE Standardized 
p-
value 
     
 Direct Effects    
BIS  Cognitive Bias .810 .137 .706 *** 
BAS  Cognitive Bias -.298 .107 -.195 .006 
Cognitive Bias  Social Anxiety 6.704 1.013 .863 *** 
     
 Indirect Effects    
BIS  Social Anxiety 5.433 -- .609 *** 
BAS  Social Anxiety -1.998 -- -.168 .010 
     
 Covariances    
BIS  BAS -.131 .074 -.154 .079 
     
 Variances    
BIS 1.126 .210 -- *** 
BAS .636 .145 -- *** 
d1 .625 .182 -- *** 
d2 22.929 4.887 -- *** 
e1 1.203 .139 -- *** 
e2 .933 .134 -- *** 
e3 1.204 .145 -- *** 
e4 1.355 .175 -- *** 
e5 1.018 .121 -- *** 
e6 1.399 .168 -- *** 
e7 .797 .109 -- *** 
e8 1.003 .165 -- *** 
e9 4.484 .457 -- *** 
e10 .677 .078 -- *** 
e11 9.447 1.146 -- *** 
e12 19.413 2.970 -- *** 
e13 73.990 8.096 -- *** 
e14 12.974 1.765 -- *** 
e15 29.686 6.357 -- *** 
e16 .287 .029 -- *** 
             
Note: *** p < .001; SE = Standard error; d1 = disturbance term1; d2 = disturbance term 2; e1 – e16 = error terms 1 – 
16. 
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Appendix B 
FIGURES 
Figure 1 
Kimbrel’s (2008) Mediated Model of Social Anxiety       
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Figure 2 
 
Hypothesized Model with the Attention Bias Variable Included      
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Note: sp1 – sp4 = Sensitivity to Punishment parcels 1 – 4; sr1 – sr4 = Sensitivity to Reward parcels 1 – 4;BAI = Beck Anxiety 
Inventory; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State Version; NA = Negative Affect; ARA = Audience Rated Anxiety; e1 – 
17 = error terms; d1 = disturbance term for cognitive bias; d2 = disturbance term for social anxiety. 
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Figure 3 
Hypothesized Model after Removing the Attention Bias Variable     
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Note: sp1 – sp4 = Sensitivity to Punishment parcels 1 – 4; sr1 – sr4 = Sensitivity to Reward parcels 1 – 4;BAI = Beck Anxiety 
Inventory; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State Version; NA = Negative Affect; ARA = Audience Rated Anxiety; e1 – 
17 = error terms; d2 = disturbance term for social anxiety. 
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Figure 4 
 
Measurement Model for BIS Sensitivity Latent Variable      
 
 
 
 
 
 
BIS
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
to Punisment
Parcel 4
e4
1
1
Sensitivity to
Punishment
Parcel 3
e3
1
Sensitivity to
Punishment
Parcel 2
e2
1
Sensitivity to
Punishment
Parcel 1
e1
1
 
 
 
             
Note: e1 – e4 = error terms 1 – 4. 
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Figure 5 
 
Measurement Model for BAS Sensitivity Latent Variable      
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Note: e1 – e4 = error terms 1 – 4. 
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Figure 6 
 
Measurement Model for Cognitive Bias Latent Variable      
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Note: e1 – e4 = error terms 1 – 4. 
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Figure 7 
 
Measurement Model for Social Anxiety Latent Variable      
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Note: e1 – e4 = error terms 1 – 4. 
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Figure 8 
Hypothesized Model with Standardized Estimates Shown      
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Note: sp1 – sp4 = Sensitivity to Punishment parcels 1 – 4; sr1 – sr4 = Sensitivity to Reward parcels 1 – 4;BAI = Beck Anxiety 
Inventory; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State Version; NA = Negative Affect; ARA = Audience Rated Anxiety; e1 – 
17 = error terms; d2 = disturbance term for social anxiety. 
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Figure 9 
Null Model of Independence          
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Note: sp1 – sp4 = Sensitivity to Punishment parcels 1 – 4; sr1 – sr4 = Sensitivity to Reward parcels 1 – 4;BAI = Beck Anxiety 
Inventory; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State Version; NA = Negative Affect; ARA = Audience Rated Anxiety; e1 – 
17 = error terms; d2 = disturbance term for social anxiety. 
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Figure 10 
Latent Model of Independence          
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Note: sp1 – sp4 = Sensitivity to Punishment parcels 1 – 4; sr1 – sr4 = Sensitivity to Reward parcels 1 – 4;BAI = Beck Anxiety 
Inventory; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State Version; NA = Negative Affect; ARA = Audience Rated Anxiety; e1 – 
17 = error terms; d2 = disturbance term for social anxiety. 
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Figure 11 
Independent Main Effects Model          
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Note: sp1 – sp4 = Sensitivity to Punishment parcels 1 – 4; sr1 – sr4 = Sensitivity to Reward parcels 1 – 4;BAI = Beck Anxiety 
Inventory; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State Version; NA = Negative Affect; ARA = Audience Rated Anxiety; e1 – 
17 = error terms; d2 = disturbance term for social anxiety. 
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Figure 12 
Partial Mediation Model           
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Note: sp1 – sp4 = Sensitivity to Punishment parcels 1 – 4; sr1 – sr4 = Sensitivity to Reward parcels 1 – 4;BAI = Beck Anxiety 
Inventory; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State Version; NA = Negative Affect; ARA = Audience Rated Anxiety; e1 – 
17 = error terms; d2 = disturbance term for social anxiety. 
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Figure 13 
BAS Constrained Model           
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Note: sp1 – sp4 = Sensitivity to Punishment parcels 1 – 4; sr1 – sr4 = Sensitivity to Reward parcels 1 – 4;BAI = Beck Anxiety 
Inventory; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State Version; NA = Negative Affect; ARA = Audience Rated Anxiety; e1 – 
17 = error terms; d2 = disturbance term for social anxiety. 
 
